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CONSTITUTIONAL FIAT:




India and Pakistan are parliamentary democracies. The governments of both
have a lawmaking feature at odds with parliamentary norms: presidential
legislation. The President, acting through the Council of Ministers, is
authorized to enact legislation in the form of "ordinances" without input from
Parliament. In a sense, ordinances are constitutional fiat, or legislation
without legislature. This article will explore this anomalous feature in India
and Pakistan, arguing that use of ordinances violates fundamental tenets of
parliamentary democracy. As the judiciaries of the two nations address
challenges to ordinances by interpreting the constitutional provisions
mustered in their support, they must consider the interaction between
ordinances and the principles on which the parliamentary system of
government is founded.
Author
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Presidential Legislation in India's Parliamentary Democracy
INTRODUCTION: THE BASICS OF PRESIDENTIAL SATISFACTION
In March 2003, the state of Gujarat in western India enacted a law, the
Gujarat Control of Organized Crime Bill, 2003 (GUJCOC Bill), to deal with the
growing frequency of terrorism and organized crime in the state. Given that a
federal law on terrorism, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002,' was already in
force, and the proposed state law was inconsistent in some respects, the
Constitution required that the President assent to it.2 In early 2004, then-
President A.P.J. Kalam, on the advice of the Union Cabinet, returned the Bill
to the State Assembly recommending that three provisions dealing with
interception of communication be deleted.3 The provisions on interception of
communication, the Union Cabinet thought, encroached on Parliament's
exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws on electronic communication and possibly
violated privacy rights in the Constitution.' Accordingly, the Gujarat State
Assembly deleted the provisions and returned a newly enacted bill for
presidential assent in June 2oo4.' Despite resolutions in the State Assembly
and other fora, the calls to expedite the bill went unheard. The Union Cabinet
sat on it for five years. Finally, in June 2009, President Pratibha Patil, on the
advice of the Cabinet, returned the bill to the State Assembly, suggesting
further amendments. The Cabinet's objections, this time around, were less
' Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 of 2002, INDIA CODE (2002), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/, repealed by Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004, No. 26
of 2004, INDIA CODE (2004), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
'The Seventh Schedule to the Indian Constitution carries three lists-Union, State, and
Concurrent-that define the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament and the state
legislatures. Ordinarily, Parliament may enact laws on matters in the Union and
Concurrent lists, while the state legislature may enact laws on items in the State and
Concurrent lists. However, if Union legislation on an item in the Concurrent list is
already in force, and the state legislature enacts legislation that is repugnant to the
provisions of the former, the state legislation may come into force only when after it
has received the assent of the President. INDIA CONST. art. 254, § 2.
' Tone Down Terror in Gujcoc: Centre, DNA INDIA (June 20, 2009), http://www.dnaindia
.com/india/reporttone-down-terror-in-gujcoc-centre_1266723-
The Union Cabinet of the NDA Government, which was in power at the time, was
particularly uncomfortable with three provisions in the GUJCOC Bill. Clauses 14,15, and
16 of the Bill provided important powers to the District Collector to intercept
communication, electronic or otherwise, and made such evidence admissible during
trials. Incidentally, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of such
provisions as are already in force in the neighboring state of Maharashtra, rejecting
arguments that the law violated privacy rights in the Constitution. See Maharashtra v.
Bharat Shah, (2oo8) 12 S.C.A.L.E. 167.
'Alternative to POTA: Assembly Passes Bill, HINDU (June 3, 2004), http://www.hindu
.com/2004/o6/0 3/stories/200 4o603o15ioo.htm.
6 Syed Khalique Ahmed, Bitter Bill?: GU/COC Divides Legal Fraternity, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bitter-bill-gujcoc-divides-legal-
fraternity/366886/o.
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clear. The Union Home Minister spoke of inconsistencies and the need for
refinement.7 Interestingly, a law with identical provisions, having received
presidential assent earlier, was already on the books in the neighboring state
of Maharashtra.8 What of the Gujarati bill, then? It would appear that the
Union Cabinet had a veto power over the State Assembly despite the
legislative competence of the latter. Is executive control over legislative
proceedings appropriate?'
A parliament, in a representative democracy, is the principal legislative
body. Statutes it enacts enjoy presumptive legitimacy because they satisfy
minimum constitutional requirements. Procedurally, bills go through several
stages of drafting, parliamentary readings, and some form of majority
consensus before they are enacted into law. Despite the numeric and
procedural hurdles, control over proposed legislation from the point of
introduction is, ordinarily speaking, internal, taking place within Parliament."o
However, it is not uncommon for constitutions, especially in South Asian
parliamentary democracies like India and Pakistan, to recognize conditions
under 'which ordinary legislative controls may be entirely bypassed or, for
limited purposes, placed with executive offices. For example, presidents,
governors, and councils of ministers often enjoy "original" legislative or review
powers which, depending on the scope of such powers, may contravene a
fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy: that a statute comes into
being when and only when some majority of elected members have voted
affirmatively for it.
7 Vishwa Mohan, Centre Asks Gujarat to Change Anti-Terror Bill, TIMES OF INDIA (June
20, 2009), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Centre-asks-Gujarat-to-change-anti-
terror-Bill-/articleshow/ 467 6534.cms. For a critical comment on the Cabinet's stand,
see Vinay Sitapati, Legal Experts Counter Shivraj's Stand on Rejecting GUJCOCA, INDIAN
EXPRESS (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/legal-experts-counter-
shivrajs-stand-on-rejecting-gujcoca/379438/o. The nature of justifications given for
rejecting the Bill has important ramifications for our'understanding of this aspect of
center-state relationship. For a critical analysis of related issues, see infra Part II.
8 Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, No. 30 of 1999, available at
http://indlaw.com.
' This battle does not seem to be ending any time soon. In July zoo9, the Gujarat State
Assembly re-legislated the Bill, rejecting the recommendations of the Union Cabinet.
The Bill, nonetheless, will not come into force without presidential assent. Gujarat
Passes Anti-Terror Bill, Rejects President's Suggestions, TIMES OF INDIA (July 28, 2009),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/4829638.cms. In February 2010, the
Union Cabinet once again recommended to the President that she refuse assent to the
Bill. Maneesh Chhibber, UPA to President: Block Gujarat Crime Law, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Feb. 2, zoo), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/upa-to-president-block-gujarat-
crime-law/574389/.
10 To be sure, the "internal" metaphor is unhelpful, if pushed too far. Under Article 79,
the President is a constituent of Parliament. Therefore, for the internal reference to
make sense, it must be understood in the limited sense of referring to a deliberative
body of directly and indirectly elected members. See INDIA CONST. art. 79.
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This article, the first in a two-part series, evaluates the nature and scope of
executive control over primary legislation in India and Pakistan. Three forms
of control are in play in the Indian Constitution. The strongest form occurs
when executive offices under specified conditions intervene by entirely
substituting their choices for the outcome of the legislative procedure. The
discussion in this article shall be limited to this form, which is labeled
"substitutive" control. The second form of control involves proposals by
executive offices for changes to statutes already validly enacted. Finally,
executive offices utilizing the third form of control can officially determine
that there is a need for a particular piece of legislation under specific
circumstances. The second and third forms are less in the realm of control and
conceptually closer to "influence." In India, the President, governors, and
Councils of Ministers exercise these forms of control or influence to varying
degrees at both the federal and the state level. With symmetry of sorts, they
simultaneously exercise control and are subject to control. The Union Council
of Ministers, for example, has control over state legislatures on specific
matters" but is also subject to control by the President." Similarly, the State
Council of Ministers at times controls state legislative matters but is also
subject to control by the governor or the Union Council of Ministers.
In describing these forms of control, this article shall work from the
premise that executive control of legislative proceedings is a constitutional
aberration and therefore must be limited. In legislation, parliamentary acts are
the norm, and they are qualitatively superior-both because they satisfy
procedural conditions and because of the deliberative process they undergo.
This article will articulate a rationale for limiting the scope of substitutive
executive control without restricting the constitutional space afforded to it. To
do so, it will make three arguments. First, the concept of legislative emergency
in non-emergency times and the practice of strong forms of judicial review fail
to adequately balance substitutive control. Parliamentary democracies can and
do function well without such executive influence. Second, the Supreme
Courts of India and Pakistan have mixed records, performing acceptably in
some aspects of substitutive control but not in others. Third, textual
arguments are unhelpful in assessing the limits of constitutional
impermissibility. In assessing the space for ordinances, we would be better off
evaluating policy considerations than laboring under textual arguments. This
article will develop these arguments over the course of six sections. Sections I
and II introduce readers to the basics and the legacy of substitutive control.
Sections III, IV, V, and VI discuss, in comparative perspective, four distinct
questions that the texts raise. The issues discussed in these sections pose
challenges to substitutive control that, while important to address, do not
destroy the constitutional validity of substitutive control.
Three caveats are necessary. First, the discussion in this article and the
follow-up article is limited to executive control of primary legislation. The
"See id. at art. 254, § 2.
See id. at art. im. I shall critically evaluate both these aspects of influence in a
forthcoming article.
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article makes no reference to constitutional offices such as the Chief Justice
and the Chief Election Commissioner that exercise certain important
legislative powers conceptually closer to delegated, rather than primary,
legislation. Second, the discussion is limited to executive control over primary
legislation in ordinary times. The constitutions of both India and Pakistan
provide for significant executive control over legislative processes in times of
emergency. 3 Those issues are not discussed here. Finally, while used to
provide context, the facts surrounding the special terrorism law enacted by the
state of Gujarat shall not be the subject of discussion here. The article should
not be read as a normative assessment of Gujarat's Chief Minister Narendra
Modi or a judgment about the need for or efficacy of the law on terrorism. The
setting is intended to be generic and may have resonance in progressive
contexts as well. The facts relate to the third kind of control outlined above,
the control of the Union Council of Ministers over state legislation, and will be
the subject of a fuller treatment in a companion article.
I. PARLIAMENTARY DEVIANCE: INTRODUCING "SUBSTITUTIVE" CONTROL
The most obvious form of executive control over primary legislation in
India is the President's power to promulgate legislation, or "ordinances." An
ordinance is similar to an act of Parliament except that it is not subject to any
form of parliamentary control prior to promulgation. Article 123 of the Indian
Constitution empowers the President to promulgate ordinances during
parliamentary recess provided that "circumstances exist which render it
necessary for him to take immediate action."4 This constitutional language
appears to give the President carte blanche, but, in classic parliamentary
tradition, it is the Councils of Ministers who must be "satisfied" as to the
circumstances." Ordinances do not go through ordinary legislative review; by
definition, they are temporary executive measures intended to tide the country
over through "contingent" (i.e., exigent) circumstances. They have the "same
force and effect" as acts. Unless enacted into law, ordinances promulgated
during recess expire either if they are withdrawn or six weeks after
Parliament's reassembly, whichever date is first.6 Because Parliament must
assemble at least once every six months, 7 an ordinance has a maximum life of
seven and one-half months under ordinary conditions. Similarly, under Article
' See, e.g., id. at art. 357, § 1.
14 Id. at art. 123, § 1.
15 Id. at art. 74, § .
16 Id. at art. 123, § 2(a). For a description of the procedure for tabling an ordinance, see
MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON THE WORKING OF THE MINISTRY OF
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 41-43 (V.K. Agnihotri ed., 2004).
7 INDIA CONsT. art. 85, § 1.
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213, governors are authorized to issue ordinances at the state level that are
valid for a period not exceeding seven and one-half months.'8
A. Not Written in Stone: A Short Guide to Prolonged Ordinances
This validity period is not inflexible. The Supreme Court's opinion in the
case In the Matter of Special Reference No. I of 2002 is useful in explaining
this." Recall that each House of Parliament must meet every six months, or in
the words of Article 85, Section i, "six months shall not intervene between its
last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next
session." However, Article 82, Section 2 limits the tenure of the Lower House
of Parliament to five years, unless dissolved sooner.2 o What is the effect of
reading Article 85, Section i into Article 82, Section 2? Does Article 85, Section
1 operate as an implied limitation on Article 82, Section 1? The following set of
hypothetical facts may clarify the issue.
Assume that the House of the People holds its first sitting in June 2000.
Ordinarily, its tenure lasts until May 2005, but it adjourns after meeting in
January 2004. Article 85, Section 1 mandates that it must reconvene no later
than July 2004. Now assume that an ordinance is promulgated in February
2004. Under Article 123, Section 2, this ordinance is valid until no later than six
weeks after the House reassembles. By implication, the ordinance is valid till
mid-September 2004. Now also assume that the President dissolves the House
in June 2004 and calls for fresh elections. Article 85, Section I requires that six
months not intervene between two sessions. Is it necessary to complete
election formalities and constitute a new House by July 2004 so as to not run
afoul of Article 85, Section i? In 2002, then-President A.P.J. Kalam turned to
the Supreme Court for advice on that very point."
The six-month clause in Article 85, Section i, it turns out, might be
understood in at least two ways. The House of the People (Lok Sabha), the
lower House of Parliament, ordinarily has a five-year tenure after which the
House is newly populated based on fresh electoral results. The first reading of
Article 85, Section i leads to only intra-House applicability-that is to say, the
18 Id. at art. 213, § 1.
'9 (2002) 8 S.C.C. 237.
20 See INDIA CONsr. art. 83, § 2.
21 (2002) 8 S.C.C. 237. The case before the Supreme Court arose from a notable course of
events. In July 2002, the Gujarat Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the governor on
the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. However, the last sitting of the
Assembly was in March 2002. Under Article 174, Section i, six months must not
intervene between two sessions of an Assembly. Accordingly, it was required that the
new Assembly be in session no later than October 2002. Despite acknowledging that
Article 174, Section i is mandatory, the Election Commission claimed inability to
complete electoral formalities by the due date. The President, in exercise of the powers
conferred under Article 143, Section i, then referred the matter to the Supreme Court
for advice.
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six-month clause only applies to a particular five-year session of the House.
The second reading creates inter-House applicability: after a session of the
House of the People is dissolved, the next session of the House must meet
within six months. The Supreme Court concluded that the six-month clause
applies to intra-House sessions only: Article 85, Section i "is mandatory in
nature and relates to an existing and functional [Parliament or] Legislative
Assembly and not to a dissolved Assembly whose life has come to an end and
ceased to exist."" This is similar to Article 174, Section i, the corresponding
provision at the state level. Therefore, to return to our hypothetical facts, the
July 2004 deadline does not apply to the constitution of a new House.
The six-month limit affects the lifespan of ordinances as well. Ordinances
are valid until six weeks after the reassembly of Parliament, which ordinarily
must meet at least every six months. That limitation, we now know, does not
apply to a dissolved Parliament. If elections are not held due to an "act of God"
or other reasons, a new House of the People cannot be formed. As the
Supreme Court itself acknowledged, there is no constitutional deadline by
which that elections must take place: "Obviously ... the Constitution . .. [does
not prescribe] any time limit for the conduct of election after the term of the
Assembly is over either by premature dissolution or otherwise." 2' The
implication of this hypothetical is if Parliament is dissolved and elections
cannot be conducted for an extended period of time, an ordinance, once
promulgated, may remain valid for a period well over seven and one-half
months. But ordinances raise uncomfortable questions. Their freestanding
nature untethered from legislative restraints and time limits privilege
executive edict over primary legislation in troubling ways.
B. Statistical Story: "Legislative Emergencies" in India and Pakistan
A cursory look at the number of ordinances promulgated suggests that
"contingent circumstances" frequently occur in Indian politics." In the eight
years between 2000 and 2007, the federal government issued fifty-five
ordinances. 5 Of these, forty-one were duly enacted into law. Of the remaining
fourteen, ten are still pending or have lapsed, and four were never introduced.
These numbers are relatively small, but constant. Other than 1963, ordinances
have been promulgated every year since 1950. In 1993, thirty-four ordinances
were promulgated, the most for a single year. That decade also saw the largest
22 In the Matter of Special Reference No. I of 2002, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 237, para. 85
(emphasis added).
23 Id. para. io6 (Balakrishnan, J.).
I For a comment on its gradual intrusion into democratic practices, see Romesh
Thapar, Law or Ordinance?, 9 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1930 (1974).
" MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 56 (P.J. Thomas ed.,
2009).
26 Id.
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number of ordinances enacted: 196 in all. The following table shows the
numbers of ordinances promulgated by the Union Government, organized by
decade.
Table 1. Number of ordinances promulgated by the Union Government by decade







In neighboring Pakistan, ordinances arguably have a more egregious
record. Between 2000 and 2007 alone, the federal government promulgated at
least 380 ordinances.,8 Of these, 297 were promulgated between 2ooo and.
2003, 42 between 2004 and 2oo6, and at least 41 in 2007.29 Direct statistical
comparisons, though, are inappropriate. Pakistan's record of parliamentary
democracy is littered with extended periods of martial detours, and this is
particularly true of the period between 2000 and 2oo9. General Pervez
Musharraf was first the so-called chief executive officer and later the President
of Pakistan for the better part of that decade.3 o Also, spikes in the rate of
ordinances directly correlate with periods in which Parliament was under
suspension. There was no Parliament to speak of between 2000 and 2002, and
ordinances were probably the only way to "legislate" while retaining a
semblance of legality. The data do not show how many of these ordinances
were eventually enacted into law.3'
27 Id.; see also V.K. Agnihotri, The Ordinance: Legislation by the Executive in India When
the Parliament is Not in Session, ASSOCIATION OF SECRETARIES GENERAL OF PARLIAMENTS,
ADDIS ABABA SESSION, April 2009, available at http://www.asgp.info/Resources/Data/
Documents/DSGLUMISWZXMFHMSMGKEQORWKOMYXW.doc.
28 These figures are available at PAKISTAN LAwSITE, http://www.pakistanlawsite.com.
29 These figures do not include the vast numbers of "orders" that were also promulgated
during this time period. The count includes pieces of legislation that self-identified as
"ordinances" but refers to federal ordinances only. Provinces in Pakistan also "enacted"
vast numbers of ordinances during the same period; these are not included in this
chart.
30 For an introduction to the constitutional takeover and the early years of this period,
see generally STEPHEN COHEN, THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN (2004).
' In recent years, legislators have expended more effort in this respect. In 2009, for
example, at least fifty-three ordinances went before Parliament for formal approval. See
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN, ORDINANCES LAID, http://www.na.gov.pk/ord_1aid.html
(last visited Nov. 1o, 2010).
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Three points are relevant here. First, most ordinances do little to spell out
the contingent circumstances that made them necessary except to recite the
relevant constitutional provision. For example, the Banking Regulation
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2007 explained its rationale this way:
And whereas Parliament is not in session and the President is satisfied
that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take
immediate action to give effect to some of the provisions of the said
Bill and to make amendment to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 ...
the President is pleased to promulgate the following Ordinance.
This sort of explanation, if it can be called that, is the norm; rarely do
ordinances describe circumstances more substantively. Second, ordinances
issued in this decade cover an eclectic mix of subject matter ranging from the
mundane (administrative changes to laws relating to passports, minor
revisions to the law on bonuses, and so forth) to what may be regarded as
highly important pieces of legislation (major amendments to the patent law,
the introduction of a special law on terrorism).' The ordinance introducing
changes to the Patents Act, 1970,' for example, was highly controversial,
seeking to alter critical aspects of the patent regime in India.3 ' Third, it is
possible that some of these important pieces of legislation will not command a
majority in Parliament. Indeed, that may be the primary motivation for
introducing the legislation as an ordinance. The Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance, for example, was promulgated in October 2001. The ordinance was
allowed to lapse because it lacked majority support, was re-promulgated with
some modifications, " and was eventually enacted into law through an
Banking Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, No. I of 2007, available at
http://www.indiacode.nic.in/.
' See, e.g., Passport (Amendment) Second Ordinance, No. n1 of zoo, available at
http://www.manupatra.com; Payment of Bonuses (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 8 of
2007, available at http://www.manupatra.com; Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 7
of 2004, available at http://www.manupatra.com; Prevention of Terrorism (Second)
Ordinance, No. 12 of 2001, available at http://www.manupatra.com.
' No. 39 of i970, available at http://www.indiacode.nic.in/.
3 See Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 7 of 2004, available at http://www.manu
patra.com. For a critical review of the ordinance, see Rajendra Sachar, Wrong Medicine:
Patent Ordinance to Drive Up Drug Prices, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 5, 2005), http://timesofindia
.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/THELEADER-ARTICLE-WrongMedicine-Patent-Ordi
nance-to-Drive-Up-Drug-Prices/articleshow/98o623.cms; see also Prabhu Ram, India's
New "Trips-Compliant" Patent Regime: Between Drug Patents and the Right to Health, 5
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195 (2oo6); Shamnad Basheer, India's Tryst with TRIPS: The
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIAN J.L. &TECH. 15 (2005).
36 See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, No. 9 of 2001, available at http://www.indlaw
.com; Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, No. 12 of 20oi, available at
http://www.manupatra.com.
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extraordinary procedure.' The history of this ordinance shows the remarkable
power of this form of legislation: compelling obedience to laws that may not
enjoy widespread parliamentary support.
II. SUBSTITUTIVE LEGACY: A SHORT HISTORY OF ORDINANCES IN BRITISH INDIA
Where did this practice come from? India, or, more accurately, British
India, has had a long history of ordinances. The provisions of the Government
of India Act, 193538 (1935 Act) inspired Article 123, but the origins of the
practice trace back to at least 1773.39 For our purposes, it will be sufficient to
consider the 1935 Act and the related deliberations in the Constituent Assembly.
A. The Governor General Under the Government of India Act, 1935
The Governor General under the Government of India Act, 1935 had
extensive original legislative powers. That should come as no surprise, since
the Act did not create a fully responsible parliamentary system.40 At most, it
introduced a limited degree of self-representation into Indian politics.4 The
Act authorized the Governor General to "enact" three kinds of ordinances.
First, Section 42, the textual precursor to Article 123, provided for ordinances
in their classic form: "If at any time when the Federal Legislature is not in
session the Governor-General is satisfied that circumstances exist which
render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such
ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require."' Second, Section
43 authorized him' 3 to promulgate ordinances under circumstances that
" While bills in India must ordinarily be voted in by a majority in each of the two
Houses of Parliament, Article io8 allows bills to be enacted through a majority vote of
the members in a joint sitting of Parliament. In the case of the Terrorism Ordinance,
the government had a majority in the lower House of Parliament but not in the upper
House of Parliament. However, the government did have a majority in a joint or
combined sitting of Parliament, and it was through this avenue that the ordinance
eventually was enacted into legislation. See INDIA CONST. art. 108, § 1.
38 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 42 (Eng.).
"
9See East India Company Act, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, § 36 (Eng.); Indian Councils Act,
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 67, § 23 (Eng.); Government of India Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 61, §
72 (Eng.). For commentary, see D.C. WADHWA, RE-PROMULGATION OF ORDINANCES: A
FRAUD ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 49-59 (1983).
40 See generally JOHN PERCY EDDY, INDIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION: A SURVEY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 (1935).
" See generally H.K SAHARAY, A LEGAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA
(1970).
4' Government of India Act, 1935 § 42.
43 All Governors General appointed by the Crown were men.
n1
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rendered it "necessary for him to take immediate action for the purpose of
enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions in so far as he is by or
under this Act required in the exercise thereof to act in his discretion or to
exercise his individual judgment."" Finally, Section 44 provided for a new type
of legislation, the Governor General's Act, which facilitated the Governor
General's capability to perform his discretionary duties under the 1935 Act. 5
The power to promulgate ordinances under Section 42 was crucially
different from that under Sections 43 and 44 of the 1935 Act. Under Section 42,
the Governor General was ordinarily required to act in accordance with the
advice of his Council of Ministers, and ordinances he promulgated had a life of
six months unless enacted into law by the federal legislature.46 In contrast,
Section 43 authorized him to issue ordinances in situations where immediate
action was needed to satisfactorily discharge his functions under the Act. He
had independent responsibility on certain matters: "The functions of the
Governor-General with respect to defense and ecclesiastical affairs and with
respect to external affairs . . . shall be exercised by him in his discretion, and
his functions in or in relations to the tribal areas shall be similarly exercised."47
In addition, he was also vested with the special responsibility of preventing
"any grave menace to the peace or tranquility of India or any part thereof;
safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government;
safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities . . . and [protecting] the
rights of any Indian State and the rights and dignity of the Ruler thereof."48
Initially valid for six months, such ordinances were extendable for a further
period not to exceed six months.49 Importantly, the federal legislature had no
control over such ordinances; they only had to be laid before both Houses of
Parliament in Westminster.o
Finally, the provision for a Governor General's Act in Section 44 was truly
an independent or parallel source of legislative power. As with Section 43, the
power in Section 44 concerned the satisfactory discharge of his discretionary
functions or those requiring the exercise of his individual judgment. However,
Section 44 was not conditioned on the necessity for any "immediate action";
he could "legislate" whenever he wanted to, after explaining "to both
Chambers of the Legislature ... the circumstances which in his opinion
[rendered] legislation essential." 5'Also, unlike Section 43, a Governor General's
Act was permanent. It had the same force and effect of that of an act. In terms
" Government of India Act, 1935 § 44.
45 Id.
46 Id. § 42(2)(a).
4 Id. § n(i).
4Id. § i2(i).
49 Id. § 43(2).
'o Id. § 43(3).
' Id. § 43(1).
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of circumventing normal legislative procedures, the Governor General's Act
was the most egregious of the three mechanisms. In true dictatorial style, it
vested original legislative authority in a single unrepresentative office. An
ordinance under Section 42 was subject to some legislative control after
enactment, and a Section 43 ordinance faced temporal limits, but a Governor
General's Act under Section 44 was subject to neither.
Nor did it help that the courts broadly interpreted the provisions. The
Judicial Committee in Singh v. King-Emperor " interpreted analogous
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915 to exclude from judicial review
the Governor General's assessment of "emergency." 3 A state of emergency "is
something that does not permit of any exact definition. It connotes a state of
matters calling for drastic action, which is to be judged as such by some one,"
Viscount Dunedin wrote." That someone "must be the Governor-General, and
he alone."" Why? Any other view "would render utterly inept the whole
provision. Emergency demands immediate action, and ... [it] is he alone who
can promulgate the Ordinance."' 6
The exclusionary rule quickly became standard reasoning. In King-
Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma," Viscount Simon L.C. repeated the Bhagat
Singh dictum: "The question whether an emergency existed at the time when
an ordinance is made and promulgated is a matter of which the Governor-
General is the sole judge."'8 This wide latitude made life easy for ordinances,
and they became the principal vehicle for general administration in India,
though their frequent use disappointed the nationalist leadership.59
B. Objections Forgotten: Ordinances in the Constituent Assembly
These nationalist objections were largely forgotten in the Constituent
Assembly, the group indirectly elected to draft the Constitution of India. No
one brought serious, sustained challenge to the President's legislative powers.
52 (1931) 55 I.A. 169.
' Government of India Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 61, § 72 (Eng.).
5 Bhagat Singh, 55 l.A. at 172.
5 Id. (emphasis added).
56 Id.
(1945) 72 L.A. 57.
58 Benoari Lal Sharma, 72 I.A. at 64; see also Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Bombay, (1944)
76 I.A. 57; Das v. Bihar, (1949) F.C.R. 693.
' In his presidential speech to the Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress in
1936, Jawaharlal Nehru condemned the practice in strong words. The "humiliation of
ordinances," he said, was a reminder that the Government of India Act, 1935 had done
little to introduce self-governance in India. For a reference to the speech, see Roy v.
India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272, para. 7. See also H.M. SEERVAl, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF INDIA
18-19 (ist ed. 1968).
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Dissent was limited both in the drafting committees and in the Constituent
Assembly. Constitutional advisor B.N. Rau set the justificatory tone in his
memo to the Union Constitution Committee:
The Ordinance-making power has been the subject of great criticism
under the present Constitution. It must however be pointed out that
circumstances may exist where the immediate promulgation of a law
is absolutely necessary and there is no time to summon the Union
Parliament ... The President who is elected by the two Houses of
Parliament and who has normally to act on the advice of the Ministers
responsible to Parliament is not at all likely to abuse any Ordinance
6o
making power with which he may be vested. Hence the provision.
In the Assembly, some members expressed a distrust of the proper use of
the ordinance. Professor K.T. Shah was the most articulate voice against
ordinances, but even he tacitly conceded that there may be exigent
circumstances demanding emergency executive action. 6
However we may clothe it, however it may be necessary, however
much it may be justified, it is a negation of the rule of law. That is to
say, it is not legislation passed by the normal Legislature, and even
would have the force of law which is undesirable. Even if it may be
unavoidable, and more than that, even if it may be justifiable in the
house of emergency, the very fact that it is an extraordinary or
emergency power, that it is a decree or order of the Executive passed
without deliberation by the Legislature, should make it clear that it
cannot be allowed, and it must not be allowed, to last a minute longer
than such extraordinary circumstances would require.62
The focus in the Assembly was not on whether but on the extent to which
ordinances were necessary. Some legislators were concerned about the use of
ordinances for illegitimate purposes. For example, Pocker Sahib, who was
troubled by the practices under the Government of India Act, 1935, sought to
include a proviso in the draft article stating "such ordinance shall not deprive
any citizen of his right to personal liberty except on conviction after trial by a
competent court of law."63 Sahib provided the following justification for the
suggested proviso:
B.N. Rau, Memorandum on the Union Constitution, in THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S
CONSTITUTION 486 (B. Shiva Rao ed., 20o6).
61 Earlier in the Union Committee meeting, Shah circulated a copy of his draft articles
that included a provision, but with specific grounds on which they could be invoked.
There is no evidence to suggest that his draft was seriously debated. See K.T. Shah,
General Directives, in THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6o, at 469, 469.
62 6 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 208 (1949).
63 Id. at 203.
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The reason why I have given notice of this amendment is the recent
experience we have had in various provinces in. the matter of
enforcing ordinances and even the Public Safety Acts which have
taken the form of ordinances. The ordinances were later made into
law, but the important matter to be noted is that the fundamental
right of the citizen to be tried by a court of law has been lost . .. the
scandalous way in which even the Public Safety Acts has been
administered is an eye-opener to us that to give such a power to the
President to pass ordinances, which give unrestricted powers to
deprive the citizens of their liberty, should not be tolerated.6 4
In reply, both P.S. Deskmukh and B.R. Ambedkar dismissed the proposal
on the basis that the draft Article 123, Section 3 already addressed these
concerns: "If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision
which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it
shall be void."6 5 In other words, the President's authority to enact ordinances
was no greater than that of Parliament to pass acts. For the purposes of
competence, force, and effect, both ordinances and acts stood on the same
footing. Whatever was out of bounds for ordinary legislation was also out of
bounds for an ordinance.
This assumption of equivalence is misleading and could not have
adequately satisfied Sahib's objection. The following is the text of Sahib's
proposed amendment: "Provided that such ordinance shall not deprive any
citizen of his right to personal liberty except on conviction after trial by a
competent court of law."66 A person may be deprived of his right to personal
liberty either upon conviction after trial by a competent court of law, or,
without trial and conviction, under a law on preventive detention.6 Given
these possibilities, how does Article 123, Section 3 account for Sahib's
concerns? The simple answer is that it does not. Laws on preventive detention
are constitutional. Parliament is permitted to enact such legislation and,
therefore, the President is permitted to promulgate an ordinance authorizing
preventive detention. If the President does so, a person may be deprived of his
personal liberty without trial by a competent court of law. Was that not the
core of Sahib's concern? In rejecting Sahib's proposal, the Constituent
Assembly actually rejected the idea of substantive limits on ordinances. This
rejection, we shall see later, matters for interpretive purposes.
There were other concerns about the illegitimate use of ordinances. H.V.
Kamath, H.N. Kunzru, and Professor K.T. Shah argued that the draft form of
Article 123, Section 3 did not sufficiently limit the tenure of ordinances. For
64 [d.
65 Id. at 211.
66 Id. at 203.
67 INDIA CONST. art. 22, § 4, cl. 4, amended by Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978, § 3 (not yet in force).
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68Kamath, seven and one-half months was too long. Worried that a President
inclined to dictatorship might take advantage of the possible length an
ordinance could be in effect, Kamath proposed requiring every ordinance to be
"laid before both Houses of Parliament within four weeks of its
promulgation."69 H.N. Kunzru proposed a still shorter tenure: no more than
thirty days.o According to him, extending the tenure of validity to six weeks
from the reassembly of Parliament was unjustifiably long." Professor K.T. Shah
would not even tolerate six weeks. He proposed that ordinances end
immediately on reassembly of Parliament: "Every such Ordinance shall be laid
before both Houses of Parliament immediately after each House assembles,
and unless approved by either House of Parliament by specific Resolution,
shall cease to operate forthwith."
Dr. Ambedkar resisted the proposals because, in his view, extended tenure
was justified. Responding to Kamath and Shah, he looked back to the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. His interpretation led him to
believe that unlike Sections 42 and 43, the draft provisions in the (then
proposed) Constitution, the proposals did not provide any parallel or
independent power of legislation to the executive because the executive was
not able to pass ordinances while the legislature was in session. ' The
extraordinary power was limited to cases of legislative emergency, and even
then, only when Parliament was not in session. This exception, he thought,
was defensible on the following basis:
My submission to the House is that it is not difficult to imagine cases
where the powers conferred by the ordinary law existing at any
particular moment may be deficient to deal with a situation which
may suddenly and immediately arise. What is the executive to do? The
executive has got a new situation arisen, which it must deal with ex
hypothesi it has not got the power to deal with that in the existing
code of law. The emergency must be dealt with, and it seems to me
that the only solution is to confer upon the President the power to
promulgate a law which will enable the executive to deal with that
particular situation because it cannot resort to the ordinary processes
of law because, again ex hypothesi, the legislature is not in session.
Therefore it seems to me that fundamentally there is no objection to
the provisions.74
6 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 62, at 203.
6 Id. at 204.
7o Id. at zo6.
' Id. at 207.
* Id. at 2o8.
" Id. at 213.
7 Id. at 214.
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C. Assessing Two Arguments: Does India Need Ordinances?
The "necessary evil" argument is weaker than Dr. Ambedkar suggests for
three reasons. First, while some jurisdictions have adopted the concept of
legislative emergency in non-emergency times, others have functioned rather
well without such powers. Some South Asian jurisdictions, including
Pakistan," Bangladesh, 6 and Nepal have adopted similar executive ordinance
provisions. Sri Lanka' 8 and Malaysia' also have provided for ordinances, but
these powers are conceptually closer to the "emergency provisions" under the
Indian Constitution.8 The latter two countries do not have provisions for
dealing with so-called cases of legislative emergency in non-emergency times
despite the fact that the Sri Lankan Constitution, for example, only requires
that Parliament meet, at minimum, once per year."
Second, the practices of commonwealth jurisdictions outside South Asia
make the "necessary evil" argument even more tenuous. Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom confer varying degrees of legislative control to the
executive. 8z These powers, however, are predicated on specific cases of
emergency. In the United Kingdom, a senior minister of the Crown may make
regulations 8 under the Civil Contingencies Act, 2005, if it is urgently
"necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or
mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency."' For the purposes of that act,
"emergency" means "[a]n event or situation which threatens serious damage to
human welfare ... [or] threatens serious damage to the environment... , or []
war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the
United Kingdom."a' Such regulations have a maximum tenure of thirty days
and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny within a relatively short period of
75 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 89.
7 BANGLADESH CONST. art. 93, § I.
7 NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 88, § i, amended by Interim Constitution of Nepal (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 2oo8.
78 SRI LANKA CONST. art. 155. See Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947.
7 MALAYSIA CONST. art. 150, § 2(b).
INDIA CONST. art. 352-360.
SRI LANKA CONST. art. 70, § 2.
82See Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, c. 36 (U.K.). For commentary on this Act, see CLIVE
WALKER & JAMES BRODERICK, THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT, 2004 (2oo6). See also
Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4 th Supp.) (Can.). Emergency legislation in
Australia varies in the provinces. See, e.g., Victoria State Emergency Act 2005, No. 51 of
2005 (Vic.) (Austl.).
83 Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, c. 36, § 20(2).
8' Id. § 21(3).
8 Id. § 19.
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time. As with Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the emergency powers in these
Commonwealth jurisdictions are closer to the "emergency provisions" in the
Indian Constitution. Third, none of the fifty-five ordinances promulgated
between 2000 and 2007 satisfy Dr. Ambedkar's test of "deficiency in existing
law" or "immediate need for new law." In some cases, there was no
emergency to speak of, and in other cases, need for new legislation was
entirely predictable.
H.M. Seervai apparently anticipated this sort of objection. He defended
the practice less on grounds of governmental necessity and more through the
lens of judicial review. 8 Articles 123 and 213 "have secured considerable
flexibility both to the Union and to the State to enact laws to meet emergent
situations as also to meet circumstances created by laws being declared void
by courts of law," he wrote. He had reason to worry: "Gravest public
inconvenience would be caused if on an Act, like the Bombay Sales Tax Act,
being declared void, no machinery existed whereby a valid law could be
promptly promulgated to take the place of the law declared void."9 o In other
words, judicial review, or at least robust procedures akin to judicial review,
and ordinances must go together. If one exists, the other is necessary. This
argument is somewhat distinct from that of legislative necessity; it suggests
that the very workings of the Constitution through the application of judicial
review may generate cases of legislative emergency. The argument, however, is
belied by the experience of countries like Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and South Africa,
among others, which utilize judicial review without any provision for
ordinances.9 '
Even so, what about the specific decision that Seervai cited in making his
argument: the Bombay High Court's decision in United Motors India Ltd. v.
Bombay,92 which invalidated the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952?93 In that case,
the Bombay High Court concluded that the "Act as passed by the State
Legislature [was] ultra vires," since the broad definition of "sale" in the Act was
beyond the Bombay legislature's competence.94 The whole Act was declared
ultra vires because it was "impossible to sever any specific provision of the Act
so as to save the rest of the Act ... [because] the definition [permeated] the
whole Act."" In situations like that in United Motors, Seervai feared that the
8 Id. § 26.
87See MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 56.
8 See H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 19 (1st ed. 1967).
89Id.
90 Id.
9 1See MALAYSIA CONsT. art. 4, § i; S. AFR. CONST. 1996. art. 2; SRI LANKA CONsT. art. 120.
" (1953) 4 S.T.C. (Bombay H.C.) 1o.
9 Act XXIV of 1952.2.
9 United Motors, 4 S.T.C. at 25.
95 Id.
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"gravest public inconvenience" would be unavoidable without an immediately
available alternative legislative avenue.96 Presumably, in the absence of a new
law, state agencies could not charge sales tax and would suffer revenue losses
for the duration of the legislative void. Beyond this, it is unclear what Seervai
meant by "gravest public inconvenience."" To be sure, sales tax was and
remains an important source of government revenue, but its non-collection for
a limited duration could hardly have resulted in the catastrophic consequences
that Seervai suggests.98
Seervai appears to miss the larger point. The Constitution, as we have
already seen, requires that the Parliament and state legislatures meet at least
once every six months." This is a minimum; the constitutional expectation
unequivocally favors frequent meetings. In reality, Parliament and state
legislatures have a less than inspiring record. In the last five years, Parliament
has met, on average, 67.8 days per year;'00 between 2005 and zoo9, Parliament
has only been in session one out of every five days. Government statistics show
that the lower House met for eighty-five days in 2005, seventy-seven days in
2oo6, sixty-six days in 2007, forty-six days in 2008, and sixty-four days in
2009.'' Moreover, legislative performance is on a downward spiral. Until 1974,
Parliament regularly sat for ioo days or more annually, sitting as many as 151
days in a single year. After 1975, with the exception of five years (1978, 1981,
1985, 1987, and 1988), Parliament has never been in session for more than ioo
days in a year.' Furthermore, on at least eight occasions since 1990, the lower
House has been in session for seventy days or fewer. Based on these statistics,
Upendra Baxi is surely correct in saying, "Indian legislatures far too
disproportionately dedicate their precious time to purposes other than making
laws and public policies, mandated by Indian constitutionalism.""o3 Given this
96 SEERVAI, supra note 88, at 19.
97 Id.
98 In fairness, one must point out that the sales tax revenues are a substantial part of
the State's overall tax revenues. While this portion of the budget has gradually
decreased in the last few years, it remains an important source of revenue. For some
recent government statistics on sales tax from the state of Maharashtra, see Sales Tax
Revenue Budget Share in State Tax Revenue Budget, DEPARTMENT OF SALES TAx,
GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA, http://www.mahavat.gov.in/Mahavat/index.jsp (under
the "About Us" menu, click "Statistics," then "Comparative Statements," then "Sales Tax
Share in State Budget").
99 INDIA CONST. art. 85, § 1.
'" MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 52.
101 Id.
102 Id.
"o3 Upendra Baxi, Introduction to D.C. WADHWA, ENDANGERED CONSTITUTIONALISM:
DOCUMENTS OF A SUPREME COURT CASE IXXix, lxxxix (2009). See also Parliament Should
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poor record, frequent legislative emergencies-even genuine cases of
legislative emergencies in non-emergency times-should not be surprising."o4
But the solution to this problem is not to promote parallel legislative
mechanisms. Seervai's concern for public inconvenience is justifiable, but
better legislative performance could resolve much of the issue.
Arguments based on legislative emergencies and judicial review are
inadequate to support the need for ordinances. How, then, does one explain
Dr. Ambedkar's conviction that the power to enact ordinances is necessary?
Kamath, Kunzru, and Professor Shah viewed potential future political
leadership with suspicion. Kamath, for example, raised the hypothetical of a
dictator:
Suppose the President summons Parliament, say, after one year-Dr.
Ambedkar says "no" by a gesture-perhaps he is constitutionally
minded and he does not aspire to dictatorial powers if he be elected
President-certainly a man different from him might take unfair
advantage of this article and refrain from summoning Parliament
within a reasonable period.'o,
Professor Shah expressed similar worries:
[Ilt is true that though the nominal authority which makes the
Ordinance, is that of the President, he would be acting only on the
advice of the Prime Minister. [Even so, I do not want to] leave it to the
exigencies, or to the possibilities of party politics, to see that such
0 This might also explain why in some years, the difference between the volume of
legislation enacted and the volume of ordinances promulgated was relatively small. The
following table is a comparison between the volume of legislation and ordinances for
the period from 1990 to 1998. See generally Agnihotri, supra note 27.
Number of bills passed by Number of ordinances Percent of ordinances
Year both Houses of promulgated of all billsParliament
1990 30 10 33%
1992 44 21 47.7%
1993 75 34 45.3%
1995 45 15 33.3%
1996 36 32 88.8%
1997 35 31 88.5%
1998 40 20 50%
As the table shows, much of the legislative business throughout the nineties was
transacted through ordinances. In some years, the number of ordinances almost
equaled the number of bills enacted into law.
o' CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 62, at 205.
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extraordinary powers are exercised at any time or for any time, and
that is why [1] would require, under the constitution and by the
constitution, that a maximum period is prescribed to the life of an
ordinance."o6
Dr. Ambedkar disagreed. With his more charitable view of future political
leadership and parliamentary function, he saw no cause for alarm.
Well, I do not know what exactly may happen, but my point is this
that the fear ... is really unfounded, because we have provided in
another article 69, which says that six months shall not elapse
between two sessions of the Parliament ... Therefore, I say, having
regard to article 69, having regard to the exigencies of business,
having regard to the necessity of the Government of the day to
maintain the confidence of Parliament, I do not think that any such
dilatory process will be permitted by the Executive of the day as to
permit an ordinance promulgated ... to remain in operation for a
period unduly long.o7
His optimism prevailed. When put to vote, the Constituent Assembly
rejected all proposed amendments. Article 123, in its present form, was added
to the Constitution.
Ill. TEXTUAL STRUGGLES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RE-PROMULGATION
A. Continuity of Form: The Questionable Permissibility of Re-Promulgation
First, the text of Article 123 prompts a question regarding continuity of
form. Article 123 (and its state equivalent, Article 213) provides that an
ordinance "shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the
reassembly of Parliament.,,,08 Can an ordinance be re-promulgated? If so, are
there limits to the number of times it can be re-promulgated? Between 1967
and 1981, the state of Bihar promulgated 256 ordinances that "were kept alive
for periods ranging between one and fourteen years by re-promulgation from
time to time." 109 Re-promulgating the ordinances mechanically and
strategically, the authorities breathed life into ordinances after their
o6 Id. at 209.
" Id. at 215 (emphasis added); see also Amal Ray, From a Constitutional to an
Authoritarian System of Government: Interactions between Politics and the Constitution
in India, 25 J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 275, 275-91 (1987).
10 INDIA CONST. art. 123, § 2(a).
'" Wadhwa v. Bihar, (1987) S.C.R. 798, 8o6.
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legislatively-prescribed lifespans had passed. "o In Wadhwa v. Bihar,"' the
Supreme Court held that this practice was unconstitutional."' The majority
relied on four factors in reaching its conclusion: (1) the lawmaking function in
the Constitution is entrusted to the legislature; (2) it is contrary to democratic
norms for the executive to have the power to make law; (3) the power to issue
ordinances to tide the state over in emergencies is exceptional and should be
limited in duration; and (4) a contrary result is inconsistent with India's
"constitutional scheme.""3 These factors pay too little attention to the text of
Article 123 and its state counterpart and rely too heavily on the "norms" and
"schemes" in which the provisions are embedded.
Though defensible, Wadhwa's rejection of re-promulgation is far from
universal. On two separate occasions, the Patna High Court interpreted Article
213 in favor of the power to re-promulgate.'" Judge Singh believed judicial
remedy to be inappropriate. Referring to the permissibility of re-promulgation,
he concluded as follows in Singh v. Bihar:
The Constitution ... vested the Governor with power to promulgate
Ordinance [sic] when Legislature is not in session and such an
Ordinance is given the same force and effect as an Act of Legislature
... it [was] not for the Court to declare such an Ordinance ultra vires
on this score. ... It is for the Legislature of the State to disapprove of
it, if the State is sought to be ruled by successive Ordinances, as and
when it meets, or for the electorate to disapprove of the conduct of its
no For a copy of a circular letter advising repromulgation, see Wadhwa, supra note 109,
at 813. For a detailed description of the assiduous manner in which legislative sessions
were timed, and their implications for keeping ordinances alive, see WADHWA, supra
note 39, at 8-17.
' A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579. The case has an interesting history. Agrarian economist Dr. D.C.
Wadhwa is India's most well-known expert on ordinances. In 1982, while researching
land reforms in the state of Bihar, he stumbled upon the practice of re-promulgating
ordinances in Bihar. Over the next few years, he painstakingly put together the
necessary documents from governmental archives to make the case against re-
promulgation under the Indian Constitution. See generally WADHWA, supra note 39. For
selected reviews, see Ashok H. Desai, Government by Ordinances, 19 EcON. & POL. WKLY.
2076 (1984); Jill Cottrell, Book Review, 33 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 503 (1984); Craig Baxter,
Book Review, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 158 (1985). In 1984, Dr. Wadhwa
engaged in "public interest litigation," petitioning the Supreme Court for a stay on the
practice and a declaration that the practice was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
decision in Wadhwa was the outcome of that writ petition.
"' In 2oo9, Dr. Wadhwa published a collection of documents describing the trajectory
of the case in the Supreme Court. For a detailed account of the hearings and orders
leading to the decision, see WADHWA, supra note 39, at xvii-lxxviii.
"I Wadhwa, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. at 8oo-oi.
" See Singh v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1975 (Patna H.C.) 295; Biri v. Bihar, (1973) 32 S.T.C. (Patna
H.C.) 573.
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accredited representatives for having ruled the State by means of
Ordinances and reject them at the next poll."'
S.P. Sathe sympathized with this reasoning, finding the legislature to be
the proper forum to work change. Referring to Dr. Wadhwa's petition to the
Supreme Court, he wrote: "Although the matter he brought before the Court
was of great importance, it should have been brought before the legislature
because such clandestine re-promulgation of ordinances was an affront to the
legislature and the legislature alone should have corrected it and reprimanded
the government.""6 Dr. Wadhwa, however, saw it differently:
The political approval of a measure by the Legislature on the one hand
and the need for legal compliance with constitutional requirements
on the other hand are two different things. The Patna High Court
judgment attributes importance only to the former, putting the latter
in a low key or even in a negative key."'
Where, then, did Wadhwa and Sathe disagree? At issue here is the
appropriate scope of judicial remedy in redressing unconstitutional practices.
Both Sathe and Wadhwa agreed on the constitutional wrong: re-promulgation
is impermissible. However, Wadhwa believed that the wrong had a judicial
remedy, and Sathe believed it did not:
The only justification for the Court's intervention was that such
fraudulent re-promulgation of ordinances was a gross violation of the
Constitution. But article 32 was not meant for providing remedies
against any violation of the Constitution. It is specifically provided for
being used against violations of fundamental rights .... Did that
mean the Court conceded that Wadhwa had a fundamental right that
he should be governed according to the Constitution?"8
Though valid in the context of this particular case, Sathe's arguments carry
less weight for petitioners who are more closely tied to or more directly
affected by the legislative practice."' Under those facts, Sathe might be forced
to agree with Wadhwa that judicial remedy is indeed appropriate.
"15 A.I.R. 1975 (Patna H.C.) 295, para. 16.
"6 S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 124 (2002).
"7 WADHWA, supra note 39, at 33.
"8SATHE, supra note u6, at 33.
"' Beyond that, there are other avenues through which the matter may have been
"appropriately" decided. For example, the Supreme Court could have exercised its
appellate powers to hear matters originally decided by the High Courts in exercise of
their writ jurisdictions. The scope of the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Article 226 is considerably broader than that of the Supreme Court under Article 32. See
INDIA CONsT. art. 226, § 1.
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B. Re-Promulgation Exceptions: Are All Re-Promulgations Invalid?
Two facets of Wadhwa have attracted wide attention and criticism. First,
there was a mismatch between the Court's hortatory denunciation of the
practice and its formal order. Chief Justice Bhagwati was scathing in his
criticism of re-promulgation. He considered the "enormity of the situation ...
startling"2 o at one point; elsewhere, he denounced the practice as "nothing
W 11122
short of usurpation,"2 a clear "subverting [ofi the democratic process, a
"subterfuge,"'23 as "reprehensible,"" and finally, as "a fraud on the
Constitution." 2  But this litany of linguistic censure did not translate into
judicial stricture. Except for invalidating one of the three ordinances
specifically challenged in the petition, the Court settled for "hope and trust
that such practice shall not be continued in the future.Ize It neither said nor
did anything about the practice that had otherwise taken deep roots in Bihar.
The narrative of subversion, subterfuge and fraud, Upendra Baxi suggests, was
inconsistent with the Court's "hope and trust" order:
[Bloth "hope" and "trust" are singularly misplaced in a context where a
state has usurped unconstitutionally the power of the elected
representatives of the people. . . . It is abundantly clear that the
exceedingly brief judgment in this case altogether surrenders the
pedagogic function of social action litigation and jurisprudence. Their
Lordships denounce, rightly, a pattern of ordinance-prone behaviour
of the State of Bihar. But they make no visible attempt to understand
127let alone explain its originary epidemiological dimensions.
Secondly, the Court's ruling that re-promulgation is unconstitutional
leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, is re-promulgation per se
unconstitutional? That is unlikely. Chief Justice Bhagwati listed circumstances
in which the executive may be compelled to re-promulgate an ordinance:
Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be possible for
the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a
Bill containing the same provisions as in the Ordinance, because the
Legislature may have too much legislative business . . . or the time at
'o Wadhwa v. Bihar, (1987) S.C.R. 798, 8o6.
2 Id. at 8i6.
12id.
123 Id. at 817.
124 Id. at 88.
12 Id. at 86.
126 Id. at 88.
127 BAXI, supra note 103, at lxxxvi-lxxxvii.
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the disposal of the Legislature ... may be short, and in that event, the
Governor may legitimately find that it is necessary to repromulgate
the Ordinance. ,8
Note that there is nothing in the four steps outlined earlier that requires
or validates this exception. What the exception suggests is that the Supreme
Court only invalidated mechanical re-promulgation of ordinances, not re-
promulgation per se. Promulgation or re-promulgation, as an exercise of
legislative powers, requires application of mind, not just clerical
rubberstamping. If the exigent conditions remain, and there are adequate
reasons that the legislature failed to convert the ordinance into law, re-
promulgation may be valid. This distinction sets re-promulgation apart from
promulgation.
C. Assessing Exceptions: Text, Policy and "Justifiable Reasons"
Our focus now turns to defining "adequate reasons" that would justify re-
promulgation. Chief Justice Bhagwati pointed to two. First, if the volume of
legislative business in the intervening session prevented the government from
passing a bill, re-promulgation would be acceptable. "' Second, if an
intervening session were too short to enact an ordinance into law, re-
promulgation could be also be permitted. 30 Both these options, to some
extent, violate the fundamental requirement that an "emergent situation" (i.e.,
unexpected exigent circumstances) is a prerequisite for re-promulgation. If a
legislative emergency sufficient to justify a make-do ordinance persists, why
should such a matter should be treated with low priority? If the legislature
declines to handle ordinance-related matters because of volume of work or
brevity of time, that itself may be a reason to doubt the existence of emergent
conditions.
Unsurprisingly, Justice Bhagwati's exceptions to the rule against re-
promulgation were greeted with skepticism. A.G. Noorani was personal in his
criticism: "When Justice P.N. Bhagwati retired as Chief Justice of India even
those who had made it their vocation in recent years to extol his qualities had
to concede that when it came to great power timidity was his watchword.""
The exceptions carved out by Chief Justice Bhagwati, Noorani thought, were
"wholly gratuitous and [robbed] the judgment of merit and value."'" For him,
"[iut was a case of interpretation and the exception, based on pure legislative
convenience, [derived] no sanction from Article 213.1"31 It was, as he put it,
128 Wadhwa v. Bihar, (1987) S.C.R. 798, 816.
129 Id.
130 Id.




"devoid of any justification."'" Anil Nauriya, in his more measured analysis,
pointed out the incoherence of the propositions.' Given that the decision
outlawed "only successive repromulgations, indulged in as a practice," Nauriya
argued the following:
[The Court has] upheld three contradictory and inconsistent
propositions ... The first, that the subjective satisfaction of the
governor as to whether an ordinance is necessary remains outside
judicial scrutiny. The second, that in some cases repromulgation may
be constitutionally justifiable, and finally, that successive
repromulgation would be bad. If the first and second pro ositions are
maintained, it is difficult to see how the third can stand."
Nauriya, in other words, is not so much concerned with the exceptions
alone. Rather, he is interested in how the exceptions compete with the other
strands of reasoning, particularly those relating to. judicial review in
Wadhwa.'" For him, the incoherence is obvious, since the propositions do not
add up. But this incoherence, or what he refers to as "judicial creativity
combined with judicial coyishness," is not totally useless.* Lest his analysis be
read too strongly, he is quick to add, "It should not be assumed that we are
deploring this phenomenon, for a restrained form of judicial artistry may well
be necessary if the court is to uphold essential democratic principles and yet
survive.""9
Noorani's view is different. Adamant that the exceptions are unjustified,
he wants all re-promulgations to be invalidated, not just mechanical ones.
Unlike Nauriya, he has no time for "artistry," "creativity," or "coyishness." For
all his conclusory belligerence, Noorani's arguments are remarkably empty. He
gives no reason for opposing all forms of re-promulgation except for his banal
point that "the exception . . . derives no sanction from Article 213."' It is one
thing to state that the exceptions do not adequately engage with the text. It is
entirely something else to rest one's critique solely on the ground that a piece
of text does or does not "include" something. Texts are more malleable than
Noorani is willing to admit. It is unclear how much of Indian constitutional
law will survive if we take seriously Noorani's textual standards, whatever they
are. Is the "reasonableness doctrine" of equality borne out by the text of Article
' Id. See also Jill Cottrell, Re-Promulgation of Ordinances in India: A Note, 37 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 1044,1044-45 (1988).
13 See generally Anil Nauriya, Indian Judicial Renascence: The Lines Not Crossed, 22
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 239 (1987).
36 Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).
" See infra Part V discussing the issues relating to judicial review.
'3 Nauriya, supra note 135, at 241.
'39 Id.
'" Noorani, supra note 131, at 357.
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14?"' Is the Constitution's expansive array of fundamental rights supported by
the phrase "life and personal liberty" in Article 21?' Can the doctrine of "basic
structure" be founded exclusively upon the text of Article 368, Section 1?'
These examples are only the tip of the iceberg.
But as Dr. Wadhwa's recent analysis suggests, textualism's clarity remains
attractive.' A host of English and Indian decisions on statutory interpretation"
helped him to the conclusion "that courts cannot add words into a Statute if
the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous.",'6 The language of
Article 213, he felt, was "very clear and unambiguous" and did not mention re-
promulgation. A re-promulgation exception, therefore, had no textual basis.
These textual arguments are Unhelpful; clarity or ambiguity of the text
depends heavily on the reader. It is only understandable that Dr. Wadhwa,
with his long years of dedicated research, should find in the text of Article 213
a strong justification for prohibiting this undemocratic practice. Even without
his textual theories, Dr. Wadhwa does have credible arguments against re-
promulgation. He responded to the twin exceptions based on brevity of the
legislative session and high volume of legislative business carved out by Chief
Justice Bhagwati with the following words:
If the time at the disposal of the legislature in a particular session is
short, the solution does not lie in the repromulgation of an Ordinance
but it lies in extending the duration of the session of the legislature.
After all, there is no upper limit fixed in the Constitution for the
duration of a session of the legislature. 8
This may be the strongest argument yet against the specific exceptions carved
out in Wadhwa.
' For a judicial exposition of the "reasonableness doctrine" in Article 14, see Hasia v.
Mujib, (1981) I S.C.C 722; Gandhi v. India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248; Royappa v. Nadu, (1974) 4
S.C.C. 3. For commentary, see M.P. Singh, The Constitutional Principle of
Reasonableness, 3 SUP. CT. CASES 31 (1987).
142 For commentary, see generally S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 124 (2002).
"3 For a judicial exposition of the doctrine of "basic structure" in Article 368, see
Bommai v. India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1; Rao v. India, (1981) 2 S.C.C. 362; Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
India, (1980) 3 S.C.C. 625; Bharati v. Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225. For analysis, see
generally SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA (2009).
'" WADHWA, supra note 103, at 259-62.
145 E.g., Ramnarain v. Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 459; Narain v. Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 18;
Bose v. Nath, A.I.R 1945 P.C. 1o8; Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) A.C. 444
(H.L.); Magor & St. Mellons Rural Dist. Council v. Newport Corp., (1951) 2 All E.R. 839.
146 WADHWA, supra note 103, at 262.
1 Id.
1 Id. at 263.
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If the Supreme Court is to insist on allowing a limited set of exceptions to
the rule against re-promulgation, what other reasons apart from the two in
Wadhwa might validate re-promulgation? Consider the following events. On
October 24, 2001, in the aftermath of the September n attacks in New York
City, the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance Government initiated the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 (POTO).'49 Promulgated barely five
weeks before the winter session of Parliament, the ordinance sparked
outrage.' When Parliament reassembled for its winter session, the Union
Cabinet decided against introducing the ordinance for parliamentary approval.
There was little consensus among political parties on the need for the
ordinance, and the government lacked the numerical support, particularly in
the upper House of Parliament, to get the law passed."' With the lower House
eventually adjourned sine die, the Vajpayee government decided to re-
promulgate the ordinance, with some changes, as the Prevention of Terrorism
(Second) Ordinance, 2001.1, Is the absence of legislative support an adequate
reason for re-promulgating an ordinance? If anything, the absence of
legislative support was an indication that legislators disapproved of the law,
irrespective of whether the executive considered it necessary. In deciding
whether lack of legislative support constitutes an "adequate reason" to re-
promulgate an ordinance depends in part on how expansively "adequate
reasons" is defined. Wadhwa provides no guidelines for this decision, and it is
unclear if Chief Justice Bhagwati's two exceptions should be read as a closed
set.'
D. Experience from Across the Border: Re-Promulgation in Pakistan
Interestingly, in Collector of Customs, Karachi v. New Electronics Limited,
the Supreme Court of Pakistan invoked exceptions similar to those in Wadhwa
when deciding the legality of re-promulgation in Pakistan.' Under Article 89,
149 For contrasting views about the need and efficacy of such an ordinance, compare
Rajeev Dhavan, POTO: An Assault on Democracy, HINDU (Nov. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.hindu.com/2oo/u/16/stories/ 05162 5 23.htm with R.K. Raghavan, Old Wine
in a New Bottle?, 18 FRONTLINE 22 (2001), available at http://www. flonnet.com/fl1822/
1822114o.htm.
150 See Dhavan, supra note 149.
'' V. Venkatesan, POTO and a Stand-Off, 18 FRONTLINE 26 (2001), available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll826/826o9o.htm.
15' Tribune News Service, POTO Promulgated with Amendments, TRIBUNE (Dec. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020o1/nation.htm#3.
" For a less-than-persuasive argument that re-promulgation in this case was
unconstitutional, see D. Nagasaila & V. Suresh, Re-Promulgation of POTO: Is It Legal?,
37 EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 371-72 (zooz); see also Era Sezhiyan, Perverting the Constitution,
18 FRONTLINE 25 (zoo2), available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/flh825/i825iolo.htm.
141994 P.L.D. (S.C.) 363 (Pak.).
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Section i of the Pakistan Constitution, "the President, may, except when the
National Assembly is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which
render it necessary to take immediate action, make and promulgate an
Ordinance, as the circumstances may require."' Such ordinance, unless
withdrawn by the President or disapproved by the National Assembly earlier,
"shall stand repealed at the expiration of four months.""
In Collector of Customs, a finance ordinance containing provisions
identical to those of a previously promulgated ordinance was reissued at the
expiration of four months.' The National Assembly was not in session.
Adjudicating a challenge to the ordinance, Justices Ajmal Mian and Sajjad Ali
Shah, writing for the majority, concluded that the re-promulgation was valid.
They reasoned that the underlying philosophy of Article 89 was to ensure that
the legislative power remains with the legislative bodies and is not usurped by
the executive. That justification was not applicable, they said, in cases where
the "Assembly [stood] dissolved and for a justifiable reason, [had] not been
reconstituted." 8 Their rationale is as follows:
Suppose the National Assembly completes its constitutional tenure,
but elections could not take place within constitutional mandate on
account of an act of God for nearly one year. Can it be said that after
the expiry of a Finance Ordinance upon the expiry of four months, the
President cannot re-enact the same by invoking reserve power
contained in Article 89 of the Constitution[?}5 9
While Justices Mian and Shah did not lay down a test for determining
when re-promulgation was valid, their hypothetical scenario may be another
instance that Chief Justice Bhagwati would approve of as an exception to the
general rule against re-promulgation. As in Wadhwa, the focus in Collector of
Customs was on "adequate reasons." Justices Mian and Shah did not make an
exception for all cases of failed reconstitution; they limited their exception to
cases of failed reconstitution with "justifiable reasons."
E. The Challenge of Contiguous Texts: Is "Legislative Entry" a Possible Solution?
With regards to the Indian Constitution, Wadhwa's insistence on adequate
reasons point to a higher burden for re-promulgation. It raises an additional
question: when is an ordinance "the" ordinance, or the same ordinance as was
promulgated in the past? Consider, once again, both versions of POTO. Three
5 PAKISTAN CONsT. art. 89, § 1.
156 Id. at art. 89, § 2(a).
'5 Finance Ordinance, 1988, Ordinance No. 12 of 1988.
1 Collector of Customs, 1994 P.L.D. (S.C.) 363 (Pak.).
1 Id.
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provisions in the first ordinance were objectionable to many political parties: a
five-year sunset clause,'6o a provision mandating disclosure of journalists'
sources of information regarding terrorist activities, 6 ' and forfeiture clause of
terrorists' property.'62 When promulgating it for the second time, the Vajpayee
government deleted the provision mandating disclosure of journalists' sources,
reduced the sunset clause to three years, and provided a judicial mechanism
governing forfeiture of property belonging to convicted terrorists.'' These
amendments raise the "difference" question: how different must the revised
ordinance be to pull out of the shadows of the first? Or, as I put it before,
when is an ordinance no longer "the" ordinance? If mechanical, automatic re-
promulgation is constitutionally impermissible, we need a standard to
distinguish between contiguous or related ordinances to determine whether
the second ordinance is a new ordinance or merely a re-promulgation of the
first. The two terrorism-related ordinances did not raise this issue because the
government admitted that it was re-promulgating the earlier ordinance. But
what of a situation in which the government insists that the changes to the
text of an ordinance are sufficient to regard the second ordinance not as an
instance of re-promulgation but a new promulgation?
Contiguous ordinances fall within a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum
are ordinances with nearly identical texts whose changes are no more than
cosmetic. These changes may be intended to create the appearance of change
rather than meaningfully revise the ordinance. At the opposite end of the
spectrum are ordinances whose entire structure is different. The new
ordinance may define itself differently, establish different bodies, propose
different remedies, and impose different punishments. The paradigmatic new
ordinance results when the government, based on input concerning the initial
ordinance, seeks to promulgate an ordinance responding to the same
circumstances in a way genuinely different from the first. Incidentally, the 256
ordinances promulgated by the state of Bihar do not fall within this spectrum,
since the government did not even make cosmetic changes. If the court finds
good reason to believe that the ordinance is genuinely a new one rather than a
re-promulgation of the prior text, it may decide the government has overcome
the Wadhwa objections to "mechanical" re-promulgation.' 64 Most cases of re-
promulgation are likely to fall somewhere in between these two extremes. As
occurred with POTO, if the government makes important changes to the
t6o Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, No. 9 of 2001, § 1(6), available at http://www
.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTO.htm.
161 Id. § 3(8).
162 Id. § 6(2).
,63 Despite the changes and the efforts to mollify political allies, the Vajpayee
Government could not gain a majority consensus in both Houses of Parliament and,
therefore, opted to re-promulgate the ordinance.
164 Note that we may still have to deal with situations when a sufficiently differently
worded text achieves the same result as the first ordinance. Therefore, our efforts
should be directed less towards the text and more towards what it seeks to achieve.
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existing text, its claim that it is engaging in fresh promulgation rather than re-
promulgation may receive judicial affirmation.
Will textual comparisons help us settle these questions? Perhaps a test is
needed to measure continuity and change to decide whether an old ordinance
has been transformed into a new one.'61 Dr. Wadhwa's recent suggestion for a
constitutional amendment, though valuable, is not particularly helpful for
interpretative purposes."' He suggests the following amendment to Article 123:
"Notwithstanding any provision contained in this Constitution and
notwithstanding any judgment of any court, no Ordinance promulgated by the
President shall be repromulgated by him nor any Ordinance reproducing
substantially the provisions of the repealed or la Fsed Ordinance shall be
promulgated by him under any circumstances."' ' Though this proposed
amendment is a good start, I doubt its ultimate utility. After all, "substantial
similarity" is precisely the point of contention. Instead of comparing text, we
might be better off looking at the legislative entry in which a given
promulgation or its avatar is situated.
IV. THE CONTINUITY OF EFFECT: HOW LONG IS SEVEN AND ONE-HALF MONTHS?
A. Separating the Continuities of "Tenure" and "Validity"
A question about continuity of effect remains with regards to the text of
Article 123. As mentioned earlier, Article 123 ordinarily limits the legal effect of
ordinances to seven months and two weeks unless they are enacted into law.
The significance of this length of time is not clear. Do actions initiated under
an ordinance have legal effect after the ordinance ceases to exist, even though
legislation repealing the ordinance does not specifically say so? Should they?
The answer to this question depends on the definitions of "tenure" and "validity"
and the ways in which they bear upon the text of Article 123, Section i.
A hypothetical is useful to illustrate these issues. An ordinance is
promulgated and enacted into law with identical provisions. After the new act
comes into effect, a person is prosecuted for an offense allegedly committed
while the ordinance was in force. Do the provisions of the now repealed
ordinance carry over to the new act, generating de facto continuing legal
validity? The Supreme Court confronted this question in Punjab v. Singh.'6 8
The respondent was prosecuted for providing false information under Act 12 of
1948, a piece of legislation that was not in force when the offense was
committed. At the time of commission, Ordinance 7 of 1948 was in force; the
165 1 am skeptical about utility of such a test. Tests are rarely controlling, and, at best,
provide a form in which to couch one's legal arguments. They are useful to the extent
that that their requirements limit the arguments of counsel and judges.
t Baxi, supra note 103, at 292-93.
6 Id. at 293.
6 8 A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84.
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Ordinance was subsequently repealed and replaced with the Act. In short, the
effect of repeal of an ordinance was in question.
In deciding the matter, the High Court turned to the General Clauses Act,
1897.'69 Under Section 6 of the Act, where "any Central Act or Regulation ...
repeals any enactment ... then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not ... (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect
of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid."o70 For the High Court, the words "where any Central
Act repeals" were capable of at least two distinct meanings, a narrow and a
wide one. Narrowly construed, "repeal" could mean repeal simpliciter,
abrogating the existing law without saying anything more. Broadly construed,
"repeal" could include situations in which the existing law is repealed and
replaced with a new law, as in Mohar Singh. The High Court concluded that
the application of Section 6 of the Act (that is, the continuing validity of right,
privilege, obligation, liability) is limited only to cases of narrow repeal."' Why?
Cases of narrow repeal, the High Court contended, raise the possibility
that the legislature may not have given thought to the matter of prosecuting
old offenders or the matter may have been inadvertently omitted. In those
situations, the presumption raised in Section 6 of the Act would apply. But no
such inadvertence may be presumed in cases of broad repeal. If the new Act
does not deal with the matter, it may be presumed that the legislature did not
see fit to keep alive the liability incurred under the old law."' In other words,
for the High Court, obligations incurred under the old law do not have
continuing validity unless the latter legislation unequivocally says so.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The presumption in Section 6 of the Act,
Justice Mukherjea wrote, applied in both cases of repeal, narrow and broad. In
cases where repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, "one
has to look to the provisions of the new Act not to ascertain if it expressly
keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to
destroy them."3' In other words, unless the new legislation betrays a clear
intention to the contrary, the presumption applies and obligations incurred
under the old law do have continuing validity.
B. Distinguishing Six Possibilities of Repeal
The point of law raised in Mohar Singh pertains primarily to statutory
interpretation, but it does have an interesting and important application to
'6 No. 1o of 1897.
'
7 0 Id. § 6.
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ordinances. There are six possibilities regarding repeal and the introduction of
a new enactment:
A. An act is simply repealed. Nothing else follows.
B. An act is repealed and replaced by another act.
C. An act is repealed and replaced by an ordinance.
D. An ordinance is repealed and replaced by an act.
E. An ordinance is repealed and replaced by another ordinance.
F. An ordinance is simply repealed by an act. Nothing else follows.
(B) and (E) do not raise much difficulty. In the case of (B), when one act
replaces another act, the locus of the presumption is not particularly
significant, in the sense that either interpretation would validate a
parliamentary enactment. Similarly, (E) does not raise much difficulty given
our earlier discussion regarding the continuity of form. To repeal an existing
ordinance and mechanically replace it with a "substantially similar" ordinance
would fall afoul of Article 123. However, (C) and (D) are somewhat
problematic. If the Supreme Court was correct in its interpretation of the
repeal provision, it would follow that a validly enacted piece of legislation that
repeals an ordinance, as in (D), would continue to provide legal cover for all
actions executed under the prior ordinance, even when it does not
unequivocally say so.
It would follow that an ordinance that repeals and replaces an existing act,
as in (C), cannot invalidate actions carried out under the repealed act unless it
specifically says so. To the extent that our objective is to constrain the scope
and effect of Article 123, the Supreme Court's interpretation produces a
favorable result in (C) but an unfavorable outcome in (D). For the High Court,
the converse would be true. If the High Court is correct in its interpretation of
the repeal provision, it would follow that a validly enacted legislation that
repeals an ordinance, as in (D), would not provide legal basis for actions done
under the prior ordinance unless it unequivocally say so. For the same reason,
it would follow that an ordinance that repeals and replaces an existing act, as
in (C), can make illegal actions done under the repealed act unless it
specifically excludes such a possibility. Once again, if our objective is to
constrain the scope and effect of Article 123, the High Court's interpretation
produces a favorable result in (D), but an unfavorable one in (C).
The symmetrical effect of Section 6 of the Act on acts and ordinances
suggests that neither interpretation is superior. Regardless of where the
presumption falls, it is difficult to avoid privileging ordinances at least on
certain occasions. One way of avoiding this impasse may be to introduce an
act-ordinance distinction in the interpretation of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. To use the Supreme Court's reasoning, that would imply
that when an ordinance repeals an existing act, all prior rights, privileges, and
obligations survive unless there is manifest intention to destroy them.
Conversely, when an act repeals an existing ordinance, all prior rights,
privileges, and obligations are wiped out unless there is a clear statement to
the contrary. If we accepted the High Court's interpretation of the
presumption, the arguments would be reversed. This distinction, attractive as
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it may be, appears uncopstitutional. Article 123, Section 2 states that "an
Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect
as an Act of Parliament." To the extent that the foregoing argument privileges
acts over ordinances, it does not satisfy the "same force and effect"
requirement of Article 123, Section 2.
This discussion on the continuity of effect of ordinances points to two
things. First, there is likely no interpretation that would never privilege
ordinances. Nonetheless, empirically speaking, ordinances have generally been
used to introduce legislation that is subsequently transformed into acts and
rarely to repeal existing legislation that was validly enacted earlier. Therefore,
if the sole purpose of interpreting Section 6 of the Act was to constrain the
extraordinary legislative powers of the Executive, the High Court's
interpretation favoring a narrow reading of "repeal" is better. That view would
require that for prior rights, privileges, and obligations under a repealed
ordinance to survive in newly enacted legislation, Parliament must clearly
authorize it.
C. The Difference Quotient: Why is an Ordinance Not an Act?
Our discussion also focuses light on an aspect of the ordinance that is
usually overlooked. An ordinance, by its very nature, is different from an act in
one respect. Acts do not lapse; only ordinances and bills do. An otherwise
valid Act ceases to have legal effect if and only if it is repealed by a separate
Act or by the terms of the Act itself. Of course, an Act may fall into disuse, but
a state of disuse is not the same as legal invalidity. In contrast, an ordinance
ceases to have effect, the equivalent of "lapsing," six weeks after the date
Parliament reassembles unless both Houses of Parliament enact the ordinance
into law. But the lapse of an ordinance is not the same as its repeal. Repeal
involves an affirmative act; it is a conscious decision to remove legal force and
effect from valid legislation. In contrast, lapse involves inaction. To allow an
ordinance to lapse is to let it drift into a state of legal invalidity. In other
words, repeal is a formal statement of parliamentary will. Lapse of a bill or
ordinance, on the other hand, signifies a failure to secure such an approval.
The distinction is important insofar as the General Clauses Act, 189774
provides for the continuity of rights, privileges, and obligations only in cases of
repeal. '7 There is no provision in the Act that provides for the continuity of
legal actions initiated under ordinances and bills that have lapsed. Consider,
once again, the set of ordinances promulgated by the Vajpayee-led NDA
government in October 2001. With the lower House adjourned sine die, the
Vajpayee government decided to re-promulgate the Prevention of Terrorism
(Second) Ordinance, 2001 with some changes. Section 64(1) of the Ordinance
specified that "the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 is hereby
repealed." Section 64(1) additionally indicated that "notwithstanding such
174 No. io of 1897.
" See id. §§ 6, 6(A).
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repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be
deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this
Ordinance." It is only because Section 64 repealed the earlier ordinance that
the presumption raised in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 took
effect. Attorneys were correct in insisting that prosecutions initiated against
accused persons during the term of the first ordinance had continued
validity.'76 This validity, however, depended not on any abstract principles but
on Section 64 of the latter ordinance.
Now consider a situation in which the first ordinance simply lapses and is
not superseded by any other coterminous ordinance or act. Would actions
initiated during the term of the ordinance enjoy continuing validity? Section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply because this is not a case of
repeal. Indeed, there is nothing in the General Clauses Act, 1897 that could be
construed to determine the continuing validity of actions initiated under a
lapsed ordinance. It is misleading to suggest that actions initiated under a
lapsed ordinance can never be wiped out retrospectively. Rather, prior rights,
privileges, and obligations under a lapsed ordinance always are wiped out
retrospectively unless superseded by a "repeal" act or ordinance, which in turn
would have to be legislatively validated." In other words, for actions under a
lapsed, or "failed," ordinance to enjoy continuing validity, at least its repeal
must be legislatively enacted.
D. Judicial Narratives: Three Reasons Why the Supreme Court Is Wrong
The foregoing argument suggests that the Supreme Court erred in Orissa
v. Bose" in upholding the continuing validity of rights created under an
ordinance that eventually lapsed. The state of Orissa promulgated an
ordinance that sought to nullify a High Court decision invalidating the results
of a local municipal election.'79 The ordinance lapsed. The Supreme Court was
confronted with a question concerning its effect: did the ordinance, despite its
lapse, have continuing validity, or did its lapse revive the effects of the High
Court's earlier invalidation? Justice Gajendragadkar, writing for the Supreme
Court, rejected what he called the "inflexible and universal rule" that all rights
and obligations cease to have effect upon the expiration of a temporary act.
"[W]hat the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend
176 Tripti Nath, POTO Can't Lapse Retrospectively, TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, zoo), available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2oo1/2oon122i/nation.htm#3.
in Therefore, without the second Terrorism Ordinance, all arrests made and
prosecutions initiated under the first ordinance during its two-month tenure would
have lost legal validity.
17 Orissa v. Bose, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 945.
179 Id. para. I.
'so Id. para. 21.
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upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the
temporary Act," he wrote.' 8 '
If the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has
vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the
statute by which it was created has expired. If a penalty had been
incurred under the statute and had been imposed upon a person, the
imposition of the penalty would survive the expiration of the
statute.82
Therefore, based on what he took to be "the true legal position in the
matter," Justice Gajendragadkar concluded that the ordinance provided
continuing validity to the municipal elections even after its lapse.' This
rationale was taken up further in Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh,'8 in which the
Supreme Court held that the lapse of an ordinance does not revive the
government posts abolished under it.'18 To understand Reddy, consider the
text of Article 213(2):
(2) An ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same
force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by
the Governor, but every such Ordinance - (a) shall be laid before the
Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative
Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to
operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the
Legislature.!
The Supreme Court concluded that "the Constitution does not say that the
Ordinance shall be void from the commencement on the State Legislature
disapproving it."'87 Rather, "it shall cease to operate."'8 The Court took this to
mean "it should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the
happening of the events mentioned in Clause 2 of Article 213."'8
Operation or tenure is separate from validity. Reddy conflates the two. An
ordinance ceases to operate upon its failure to secure legislative approval.




'8 Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724.
"" Id. para. 18.
1 INDIA CONST. art. 213, § 2 (emphasis added).
'8 Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724, para. 19.
' Id.
189 Id.
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undertaken. What makes an ordinance valid? Necessary circumstances and
future legislative approval, I would argue, make an ordinance valid. Future
legislative approval is built into its initial validity. When Article 213(2) says that
an ordinance ceases to operate, it ceases to operate as if it had never existed.
Having legitimized previous actions under a failed ordinance, the Supreme
Court went a step further. How does one undo the permanent effects of the
failed ordinance? If Reddy is to be believed, it "can be achieved by passing an
express law operating retrospectively to the said effect."' 0 The argument
leaves us with a situation that looks something like this. The executive may
create or destroy rights, enact new crimes, or impose new taxes. All actions, at
least within a certain period of time, have permanent validity that a legislature
cannot invalidate. A properly enacted law would be needed to undo the effects
of an executive act. This is a troubling state of affairs that undermines the
fundamental idea that law with permanent effect can only be enacted through
a legislative forum.
In reiterating my earlier argument that rights, privileges, and obligations
do not survive beyond the life of a lapsed ordinance, I repeat three points.
First, Bhupendra Bose misreads section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Second, Venkata Reddy misreads Article 213. They fail to distinguish between
the repeal of a law and the lapse of an ordinance. English decisions, based on
the Interpretation Act, 1889, are unhelpful in this regard. The particularities of
the argument need to take into account the extra-ordinary legislative power
that ordinances represent, and the necessity of curtailing its scope and effect.'9'
Third, Bhupendra Bose negatives an important limitation in Article 123, and
Venkata Reddy does the same for Article 213 in providing a continuing life to
the rights and obligations created under a lapsed ordinance. An ordinance,
even when it ceases to operate under Articles 123 or 213, does not really cease
to operate. For Justice Gajendragadkar, seven and a half months are not really
seven and a half months. Seven and a half months could mean one year, five
years, ten years, or even an indefinite period of time. If Bhupendra Bose were
correct, taxes imposed under an ordinance that eventually lapses may be valid
indefinitely. There are strong reasons to suggest that such a view is
inconsistent with the "cessation" requirement in Article 123. Bearing these
infirmities in mind, the rule concerning continuing validity of lapsed
ordinances must be exactly what Justice Gajendragadkar said it could not be:
inflexible and universal. Lapsed ordinances do not have continuing effect;
everything done under their authority is wiped out.
We may also add policy considerations to this list of reasons for restricting
the operation of ordinances. Admittedly, undoing the effects of administrative
and judicial actions initiated, considered, and completed is an arduous task
with the potential to create infinite complexities. That is a good thing. Prior
knowledge that the executive would have to undo actions already completed
unless it succeeds in securing legislative approval in the future will and should
Igo Id.
19' See Steavenson v. Oliver, 151 E.R. 1024; Warren v. Windle, 102 E.R. (K.B.) 578; Wicks
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1947) A.C. 362.
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weigh heavily in deciding if an ordinance is needed. At the moment, the rule
of de facto validity invites a cavalier approach. A failed ordinance has no legal
cost and is unlikely to promote responsible practices. A legal requirement to
undo completed transactions under a failed ordinance will do much to
promote responsible governance while dramatically decreasing the number of
ordinances promulgated.
In this regard, the separate opinion of Justice Sujata Manohar in Krishna
Kumar Singh v. Bihar bears careful consideration.9' The state of Bihar had, by
a series of nearly identical ordinances, taken over the management and control
of nongovernmental educational institutions, making previous employees
government employees under the new management. 193 Eventually, the
ordinance and its subsequent avatars failed because the Bihar Legislative
Assembly did not enact it into law.'94
Justice Manohar concluded that the failed ordinance did not create any
permanent effects. While her views, in my opinion, do not go far enough, they
are closest to the arguments outlined earlier and provide a possible judicial
basis for reassessing the law on permanent effects.
The general rule [is] that an Ordinance ceases to have effect when it
lapses or comes to an end ... Since an Ordinance by its very nature, is
limited in duration and is promulgated by the Executive in view of the
urgency of the situation, we must examine the rights which are
created by an Ordinance carefully before we decide whether they are
permanent. Every completed event is not necessarily permanent.'91
Thus, Justice Manohar reminded us that what is done can be undone and any
construction can be demolished.' 6
One -should not readily assume that an Ordinance has a permanent
effect, since by its very nature it is an exercise of a limited and
temporary power given to the Executive. Such a power is not expected
to be exercised to bring about permanent changes unless the
exigencies of the situation so demand. Basically, an effect of an
Ordinance can be considered as permanent when that effect is
irreversible or possibly when it would be highly impractical or against
public interest to reverse it e.g. an election which is validated should
not again become invalid. In this sense, we consider as permanent or
enduring that which is irreversible. What is reversible is not
permanent.'9 7
'
9 2 Singh v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2288.
193 Id. para. 16.
194 Id. para. 15.
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Using this interpretive approach, Justice Manohar caused the employees
to revert to their previous status. She concluded that the lapsed ordinance did
not make the staff permanent government employees.9 8
E. Learning from Neighbors: Pakistan's Struggle with Foundational Concepts
Ordinance-related provisions in the Pakistan Constitution stand in
contrast to the argument I have sketched out. Article 89, Section 2 states as
follows:
An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same
force and effect as an Act of Parliament and . . . (a) shall be laid before
both Houses (of Parliament), and shall stand repealed at the
expiration of four months from its promulgation or, if before the
expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by
either House, upon the passing of that resolution.'99
Note that this provision, unlike Article 123 in the Indian Constitution,
equates the failure to validly enact an ordinance into law with repeal. In
Pakistan, to say that an ordinance has lapsed is to say that it has been
repealed. They are one and the same. Further, Article 264 defines the effect of
repeal:
Where a law is repealed or is deemed to have been repealed, by,
under, or by virtue of the Constitution, the repeal shall not except as
otherwise provided in the Constitution ... (c) affect any right,
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under
the law . .. or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty,
forfeiture or punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceeding
or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the law had
not been repealed."oo
Radical implications of the "repeal effect" are not difficult to see. For
instance, let us imagine that an ordinance criminalizing kite flying is
promulgated in Pakistan. When introduced in the National Assembly, the
ordinance, given the popularity of the sport, fails to get majority support. It
lapses, or, to use the language of Article 89, "stands repealed." Under Article
264, notwithstanding the so-called repeal, all prosecutions initiated during the
tenure of the ordinance along with all possible future convictions are legally
' Id. para. 37.
'9 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 89, § 2 (emphasis added).
200 Id. at art. 264.
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valid. This enforced legality is disturbing, and its justifications are not clear.
Penalizing a person (or, for that matter conferring any right, privilege,
obligation or liability) under a piece of "legislation" to which a majority of
elected members have expressed formal opposition is troublihg. And if
Bhupendra Bose and Venkata Reddy are correct, some version of Article 89
exists in the Indian Constitution too, even though it does not seem to exist.
Why is Pakistan saddled with this troubling possibility? Because of the
inability to make a relatively simple distinction between repeal and lapse.
Repeal, to reiterate an earlier point, is an affirmative act: where members agree
to remove a law from the statute books. Lapse, on the other hand, is about
parliamentary refusal to adopt a proposed ordinance when members agree
that it should not be enacted into law. This is most evident in the case of bills.
A bill lapses when the executive, having introduced it in Parliament, fails to
secure a majority. No one argues that a bill, whether lapsed or otherwise,
should have formal quality in a legal system. The argument is no different for
ordinances. In addition, ordinances modify the classic Westminster system in
an important way. Unlike in the United Kingdom, the executive in India or
Pakistan may promulgate "enactments." The permanence of an enactment
promulgated in the exercise of executive power remains subject to future
parliamentary approval. Without such approval, an ordinance is really an
executive decree with the trappings of an act. Allowing an ordinance to
generate permanent effects despite its failed status legitimizes an alternative
forum for enacting laws and undermines the fundamentals of parliamentary
democracy. Pakistan has treaded this dangerous slippery slope, and its
experience is not worth emulating. There are good reasons for reconsidering
Bhupendra Bose and Venkata Reddy.
V. MAJESTIC SATISFACTION: WHAT IF A PRESIDENT BELIEVES IN FLYING HORSES?
The provisions of an ordinance, like those of any act, are subject to judicial
review. Ordinances may not contain provisions "which Parliament would not
under this Constitution be competent to enact."20 ' However, is the satisfaction
of the President about the "need for immediate action" subject to judicial
review? Consider, once again, the text of Article 123, Section 1: "If at any time,
except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is
satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take
immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances
appear to him to require.,20o It must be emphasized that the focus here is on
the President's satisfaction as to whether a new law is immediately needed.
When Parliament is in session, ordinarily, a parliamentary committee will
inquire into the need for a particular legislation. Presumably, such a
committee will study the existing legal arrangements and applicable laws,
20 INDIA CONsT. art. 123, § 3; see also Nagaraj v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 551.
202 INDIA CONsT. art. 123 § 1 (emphasis added).
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consider new situations, and, if necessary, propose a new piece of legislation to
Parliament.
With ordinances, however, a similar assessment is not possible; by
definition, Parliament is not in session. It is for the President, on the advice of
the Council of Ministers, to assess the need for an ordinance. The core of our
discussion is the judicial review of presidential satisfaction. In other words, is
the President's assessment of immediacy subject to judicial review? In 1975,
the following amendment was appended to Article 123: "Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution, the satisfaction of the President mentioned in
Clause (i) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any
Court on any ground.,,20 3 Three years later, it was deleted.20 4
A. Judicial Review of Executive Presidential Satisfaction: An Outline
Before we get into the discussion, some matters need be clarified.
Presidential satisfaction under the Indian Constitution is now commonly
agreed to be subject to judicial review under certain circumstances.o5 Three
kinds of emergencies in Part XVIII of the Constitution directly implicate
presidential satisfaction. Article 352 deals with national security:
If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened,
whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by
proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole
of India.or of such tart of the territory thereof as may be specified in
the proclamation.
Article 356 deals with failure of constitutional machinery in the states:
If the President ... is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation (a)
assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the
State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the
Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the
legislature of the State.o7
203 Id. at art. 123, § 2.
204 Id. at art. 123, § 14.
205 See Prasad v. India, (2006) 2 S.C.C. i; Bommai v. India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1; Patwa v.
India, 1993 Jab. L.J. 387.
2o6 INDIA CONST. art. 352, § 1.
2 Id. at art. 356, § 1.
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Finally, Article 360 deals with financial emergency: "If the President is
satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of
India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, he may by a
Proclamation make a declaration to that effect." 208 A proclamation of
emergency in either situation involves significant transfer of powers to the
Union executive, including the authority to "enact" legislation, if delegated by
Parliament.2 0 ' While the emergency provision under Article 352 has been
invoked three times, it has never been judicially challenged. Article 360 has
never been invoked.2 o In contrast, Article 356, Section i has been invoked over
a hundred times, and the President's satisfaction has been frequently
challenged.2 n In Bommai v. India,2t 2 a majority of the Supreme Court concluded
that the President's satisfaction under Article 356, Section 1 is judicially
reviewable. Justice Sawant defined the President's satisfaction as follows.
[The President's satisfaction cannot be] the personal whim, wish, view
or opinion or the ipse dixit of the President . . . but a legitimate
inference drawn from the material place before him which is relevant
for the purpose. In other words, the President has to be convinced of
or has to have sufficient proof of information with regard to or has to
be free from doubt or uncertainty about the state of things indicating
that the situation in question has arisen. Although, therefore, the
sufficiency or otherwise of the material cannot be questioned the
legitimacy of inference drawn from such material is certainly open to
judicial review.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jeevan Reddy expressed the same view:
Without trying to be exhaustive, it can be stated that if a Proclamation
is found to be mala fide or is found to be based wholly on extraneous
and/or irrelevant grounds, it is liable to be struck down. . . . In other
words, the truth or correctness of the material cannot be questioned
by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material. It will
also not substitute its opinion for that of the President. Even if some
of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant,
the court will still not interfere so long as there is some relevant
material sustaining the action. The ground of mala fides takes in inter
alia situations where the Proclamation is found to be a clear case of
2o8 Id. at art. 360, § 1.
209 See id. at art. 357, § I.
20 M.P. SINGH & V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 843 (20o8).
2n For a description of some of these "emergencies," see GLANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING OF
A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 534-45 (1999).
212 Bommai v. India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. I.
213 Id. para. 74 (Sawant, J.).
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abuse of power, or what is sometimes called fraud on power-cases
where this power is invoked for achieving oblique ends."'
In Prasad v. India,"' Chief Justice Sabharwal, for the majority, reiterated
the Bommai view that presidential satisfaction under Article 356, Section i is
justiciable: "The existence of satisfaction can be challenged on the ground that
it is mala fide or based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds.",' This
view, he thought, was consistent even with the narrow principles of judicial
review upheld in Rajasthan v. India." To wit, with or without the expanded
version in Bommai, subjective satisfaction of the President is subject to judicial
review. Courts will not lightly attribute bad faith or motive to the President or
the Union Council of Ministers on whose advice she acts.28 But upon a
showing of adequate materials, presidential satisfaction can be, and has been,
successfully challenged.
Does this argumentative scheme not exhaust the question of judicial
review in Article 123, then? After all, Article 123, Section i also deals with cases
of presidential satisfaction. In syllogism form, the argument is as follows.
1. Presidential satisfaction, such as that in Article 356, Section i, is
judicially reviewable.
2. An ordinance under Article 123, Section i involves presidential
satisfaction.
3. Therefore, presidential satisfaction in Article 123, Section i is judicially
reviewable.
This argument is misleading; it does not resolve the matter. It does not do
so because the nature of presidential satisfaction in Article 123, Section i is
qualitatively different from what the Supreme Court has previously dealt with. The
syllogism misleadingly assumes a kind of homogeneity; it is as if satisfaction
under Article 123, Section i is similar to the kind of satisfaction under Article
356, Section 1. When the President acts on the advice of the Union Council of
Ministers under Article 356, Section i, she acts as the executive head of the
State. In contrast, when the President acts under Article 123, Section i, she acts
as a substitute for Parliament, and does so in her original legislative capacity: it
is as if the President, represented by the Union Council of Ministers, morphs
into the Parliament. While the conceptual boundaries between executive and
legislative powers are not easy to draw, the Supreme Court in India has
emphasized the distinction on a plurality of occasions."'
214 Id. para. 374 (Jeevan Reddy, J.).
215 Prasad v. India, (2006) 2 S.C.C. 1.
2t6 Id. para. 147 (Sabharwal, C. J.)
217 (1977) 3 S.C.C. 592.
28 (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1, para. 375 (Jeevan Reddy, J.).
219 On the distinction between executive and legislative action, see PETER LEYLAND &
GORDON ANTHONY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17-28 (2005).
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B. It's Law: The Legislative Nature of Ordinances
In Garg v. India,22o Chief Justice Chandrachud explained the nature of
Article 123, Section 1: "It will be noticed that under this Article legislature
power is conferred on the President exercisable when both Houses of
Parliament are not in session.""' Though not a parallel power of legislation,
"legislative power [had] been conferred on the executive by the Constitution
makers for a necessary purpose."2 In Roy v. India,2 he made the point more
forcefully. The heading in Chapter III of Part V ("Legislative Power of the
President"), the text of Article 123, Section 2 that confers an ordinance with
"the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament" and the text of Article 13,
Section 3 that enumerates law as "including ... Ordinances" firmly point to
the conclusion that ordinances are a product of legislative power, he said.'
And Article 367, Section 2 is sufficient to take care of any lingering doubts:
"Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of, or made by, Parliament
... shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the
President." Taken together, the provisions, Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote,
are a compelling reason to conclude that "the Constitution makes no
distinction in principle between a law made by the legislature and an
ordinance issued by the President. Both, equally, are products of the exercise
of legislative power and, therefore, both are equally subject to the limitations
which the Constitution has placed upon that power."2
Thus far, I have laid out two easily recognizable points. Presidential
satisfaction, as an exercise of executive power, the Supreme Court has said, is
judicially reviewable on limited grounds. Secondly, when the President
promulgates an ordinance under Article 123, Section i, she acts in exercise of
her original legislative power. While both situations involve satisfaction, they
do so in different capacities. For that reason, the earlier syllogism, I suggested
was misleading. But it still does not explain why the difference in the nature of
satisfaction matters. If presidential satisfaction as an exercise of executive
power is subject to judicial review, does it not follow that presidential
satisfaction of legislative power is also judicially reviewable? Deductively put,
the argument goes as follows:
1. Presidential satisfaction, as an exercise of executive power, is subject
to judicial review on grounds of bad faith or arbitrariness.
2. Therefore, presidential satisfaction, in exercise of legislative power,
should be subject to judicial review on similar grounds.
no Garg v. India, (1982) 1 S.C.R. 947.
2 Id. para. 6.
222 Id.
23 Roy, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710.
224 Id. para. 12-13.
225 Id. para 14.
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This sort of deductive reasoning, however, is problematic. Working back from
a point of concession might best explain why that is so.
C. Exclusive Club: The Challenge of Reviewing "Legislative" Satisfaction
So let us assume that presidential satisfaction as an exercise of legislative
power is subject to judicial review and that it is subject to review on grounds
similar to those of executive power: irrationality, illegality, or bad faith
exercise of power. Two roadblocks follow.
First, the assumption undoes a series of decisions wherein the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the exercise of legislative power in the Indian
Constitution is subject to two conditions only. In Gandhi v. Raj Narain,226
Justice Chandrachud explained the means of determining legislative validity.
"Ordinary laws have to answer two tests for their validity," he said.'" "(i) The
law must be within the legislative competence of the legislature as defined and
specified in Chapter I, Part XI of the Constitution, and (2) it must not offend
against the provisions of Article 13 §§ i and 2 of the Constitution.,22s This view
has found support on a number of occasions. In Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell &
Co., 229 Chief Justice Ahmadi reiterated the idea that the power of the
Parliament and the state legislatures is restricted in two ways: "A law made by
the Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by Courts on two
grounds and two grounds alone[:] (i) lack of legislative competence and (2)
violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the
constitution or of any other constitutional provision."2 30 There is no third
ground, he insisted."' As recently as 20o6, the Supreme Court confirmed
this. 23 Herein lies the first difficulty of making presidential satisfaction as an
exercise of legislative power subject to judicial review.
There is a second hurdle. Even assuming that these decisions can be cast
aside and new grounds added, the nature of the grounds in question is highly
problematic. Can an ordinance be challenged on the ground that the President
was motivated by animus towards a person or group of persons? Can an
ordinance be challenged on the ground that the President did not apply her
mind in promulgating it? A long series of judicial decisions and scholarly
commentary, both in India and elsewhere, suggest that the answer is in the
negative.
226 Gandhi v. Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1590.
227 Id. para. 691.
228 Id.
2 29 Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1627.
230 Id. para. 45 (emphasis added).
Id. See also Pub. Services Tribunal Bar Ass'n v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1115.
2 Nayar v. India, A.I.R. 2oo6 S.C. 3127.
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Take, for example, English public law. In Proprietors of the Edinburgh &
Dalkeith Railway Company v. Wauchope, Lord Campbell strongly objected to
the idea that courts may inquire into the proceedings behind an act. "All that a
Court of Justice can do," he said, "is to look to the Parliamentary roll." But
"no Court of Justice can inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into
Parliament, nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what
passed in Parliament during its progress in its various stages through both
Houses."2' That is to say, if an act of Parliament is obtained improperly (for
reasons of motive, non-application of mind, or otherwise), it is for the
legislature to correct it by repealing it.236 Nor is the position any different in
cases where a legislature is deceived, and there is proof to that effect: "If a
mistake has been made, the legislature alone can correct it.""' In Hollinshead
v. Hazleton,238 Lord Atkinson asserted the point more firmly. "The motives
which influence the Legislature in passing any particular enactment, or the
purposes or objects it desired to. effect, can only be legitimately ascertained
from the language of the enactment itself viewed through the light of the
circumstances in reference to which that language was used." 39 Motive, if any,
must be located in the text. And, therefore, when "these [other] motives,
purposes, or objects are not, expressly or impliedly, revealed in language of ...
[a] statute ... it is," Lord Atkinson wrote, "wholly illegitimate to surmise or
conjecture what those unrevealed motives, purposes, or objects may have
been." 4 o Halsbury's Laws of England puts the point even more emphatically:
"If a Bill has been agreed to by both Houses of Parliament, and has received
the Royal Assent, it cannot be impeached in the courts on the ground that its
introduction or passage through Parliament, was attended by any irregularity
or even on the ground that it was obtained by fraud."2 4' In that sense, while
irregularity or fraud may be good reasons to review executive acts, they are
irrelevant in reviewing the exercise of legislative power.
Similar views have found favor in American constitutional law as well. In
Amy v. Watertown,' Justice Bradley explained the irrelevance of motive in
233 Edinburgh & Dalkeith Ry. Co. v. Wauchope, (1842) 8 Clark & Finnelly 710.
Id. para. 725.
Id. (emphasis added).
236 See Lee v. Bude & Torrington Junction Ry. Co., (187o-71) 6 L.R.C.P. 576, 582 (Willes, J.).
23 Labrador Co. v. Queen, (1893) A.C. 104, 123 (Lord Hannen). See also British Railways
Bd. v. Pickin, (1974) A.C. 765.
238 Hollinshead v. Hazleton, (1916) 1 A.C. 428. See also River Wear Comm'rs v. William
Adamson, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 743.
239 Hollinshead, (1916) 1 A.C. at 438.
240 Id.; see also Hoani Te Heuheu v. Aotea Dist. Maori Land Bd., (1941) A.C. 308, 322.
24' HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Vol. 36, para. 560 (3d ed. 1961).
242Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301 (1889).
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scrutinizing legislation: "With motives we have nothing to do." 4 3 While
individuals may be motivated by improper motives, the same "cannot be
attributed to a state legislature in the passage of any laws for the government
of the State."' In United States v. Des Moines Navigation and Railway
Company, Justice Brewer proposed a conclusive presumption of good faith:
"The knowledge and good faith of a legislature are not open to question. It is
conclusively presumed that a legislature acts with full knowledge, and in good
faith."" And the relative stability of the concept allowed Justice Brandeis in
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Company26 to conclude that
"no principle of [American] constitutional law is more firmly established than
that this court may not, in passing upon the validity of a statute, enquire into
the motives of Congress."4 7
The Supreme Court of India, on more than one occasion, has applied these
principles. In Deo v. Orissa," 8 discussing the doctrine of colorable legislation,
the Court made it amply clear that legislative competence "does not involve
any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature."" In
Dutt v. India ,5o Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, assessing the validity of a law
appropriating private property, reiterated the Narayan Deo view: "If the
legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it
to act are really irrelevant."' 1 And, "if the legislature lacks competence, the
question of motive does not arise at all. 25 2 In Bommai, and later, in
Rameshwar Prasad, the Supreme Court impliedly accepted the argument that
only presidential satisfaction in its executive capacity may be challenged on
grounds of mala fide, unreasonable or irrational exercise of power. 53
In Rameshwar Prasad, the Court wrote that "the power under Article 356 is
legislative in character and, therefore, the parameters relevant for examining
243 Id. at 319.
244 Id.
2 United States v. Des Moines Navigation & Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 510, 544 (1892); see also
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Doyle v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876);
Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (i8io).
246 Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
247 Id. at 161. See also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53-59 (1904); Weber v. Freed,
239 U.S. 325, 330 (1915); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, z50 U.S. 163, 184 (1919);
THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 186 (1st ed. 1868).
248 Deo v. Orissa, (1954) 1 S.C.R. i.
249 Id.
250 Dutt v. India, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1295; see also Kerala v. People's Union for Civil
Liberties, (2009) 8 S.C.C. 46, para. 65-71; Board of Trustees, Aurvedic & Unani Tibla
Coll. v. Delhi, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 458.
25' Dutt, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1295, para. 16.
252 Id.
253 See Bommai v. India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. I, para. 377 (Jeevan Reddy, J.).
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the validity of a legislative action alone are required to be considered."254 That
is to say that the concept of mala fide, generally understood in the context of
executive action, is unavailable in assessing the validity of legislative action.' 5
Chief Justice Sabharwal agreed. Nonetheless, he invalidated the President's
satisfaction on the view that presidential satisfaction under Article 356,
Section 1 was not an exercise of legislative power.156 And herein lies the second
difficulty in making presidential satisfaction as an exercise of legislative power
subject to judicial review. Bringing Article 123, Section I within the scope of
judicial review requires an expansion of grounds. The foregoing discussion is
instructive in reminding us that Article 356, Section i is an inadequate
template for assessing the reviewability of presidential satisfaction in Article
123, Section I.
D. The Way Out: Three Strategies for Judicial Review
Given these challenges, what strategies are meaningfully open to someone
interested in pursuing the point of judicial review? Let us consider, once again,
the text of Article 123, Section 1: "If at any time, except when both Houses of
Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may
promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.",2 57
The exercise of legislative power in this instance, it appears, is based on three
conditions: (a) either House of Parliament is not in session, (b) circumstances
exists which render immediate action necessary, and (c) the President is
satisfied to that effect. Provided these conditions are satisfied, the President
may promulgate an ordinance.
This conditional exercise of legislative power in Article 123, Section i is
significantly different from the provision in Article 245, Section 1 that confers
ordinary legislative power to Parliament: "Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the
territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole
or any part of the State." The latter, as should be obvious, is subject to one
condition only: that the exercise of legislative power be "subject to the
provisions of the Constitution." To the extent that the exercise of legislative
power under Article 245, Section I is also conditional, it is misleading to
emphasize "conditionality" as the distinguishing feature of Article 123, Section
1. Therefore, recasting Article 123, Section i as a circumstantially conditional
exercise of legislative power may be a more apt description. While Article 123,
Section I specifies the particular circumstances in which legislative power is
exercisable, Article 245, Section i is silent on the matter; it leaves it to the
Prasad, (2oo6) 2 S.C.C. 1, para. 144.
255 Id.
256 Id. para. 145.
257 INDIA CONST. art. 123, § I (emphasis added).
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discretion of Parliament. Bearing in mind the differences between
circumstantially conditional and ordinarily conditional legislative power, we
may turn to the question of strategies for judicial review.
Three competing strategies may be available to deal with the question of
judicial review. The first strategy might be to equate judicial review of ordinances
(circumstantially conditional exercise of legislative power) with those of acts
(conditional exercise of legislative power) while arguing that both are
reviewable on identical grounds. We know acts cannot be reviewed for motive.
Therefore, ordinances too cannot be reviewed based on motive. Adopting this
strategy, however, requires a specific maneuver. It emphasizes the legislative
nature of the power while underplaying its conditionalities. That is to say, the
fact that the powers are premised on distinct conditions are relatively
inconsequential in assessing the permissibility of judicial review. Rather, the
inquiry turns on the admittedly legislative nature of the power involved.
The second strategy, especially for those inclined to favor judicial review,
might be to disassociate the review of ordinances from acts, by emphasizing
the circumstantial conditions that distinguish the former. Differences are
highlighted rather than downplayed. While both ordinances and acts are
products of legislative power, they are prefaced by different conditions, thus
making them distinct categories of legislative power. Therefore, ordinances are
justiciable on grounds normally inapplicable to legislation, including motive.
That both share the narration of legislative power is relatively immaterial (or
inconsequential). Rather, judicial review turns on the admittedly distinct
conditions that preface the exercise of such power. This strategy impliedly
works on a category of what may be called intermediate legislative power, one
that is neither fully executive (Article 356) nor legislative (Article 245). It is
mostly, though not entirely, legislative.
The third strategy might be to equate ordinances with acts, while arguing
that the entire body of precedents prohibiting judicial review of legislation
based on bad faith be eradicated. Such an approach would argue that thus far
courts have erred in refusing to review the constitutionality of acts based on
legislative motives. If motivated by animus towards a person or group of
persons, a law should be invalidated. For that reason, an ordinance should also
be invalidated if presidential satisfaction in promulgating an ordinance is
vitiated by improper motive. In that sense, the third strategy is a hybrid: it
equates ordinances with acts, as in the first argument described, but argues in
favor of judicial review, as in the second argument described. Because it wants
to reorganize the category of legislative power, emphasis on conditionalities is
irrelevant. Unlike the second, this strategy does not rely on any intermediate
category but is far-reaching in that it unsettles parts of accepted review
principles. The second strategy, in comparison, is relatively modest: applicable
principles are left untouched while expelling ordinances from its purview.
E. Locating the Strategies: Are Choices Equally Arbitrary?
Bearing in mind these alternatives, we can briefly explore how these have
played into judicial decisions and scholarly literature. The Supreme Court of
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India has, for the most part, remained strongly anchored to the first strategy.
In Nagaraj v. Andhra Pradesh, 8 Chief Justice Chandrachud made the point
emphatically: "It is impossible to accept the submission that [an] Ordinance
can be invalidated on the ground of non-application of mind."' The power to
issue an ordinance, he reminded us, was "not an executive power but [a]
power of the executive to legislate.", 6o Therefore, an ordinance could not be
"declared invalid for the reason of non-application of mind, any more than any
other law [could] be.,, 6" Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, had
an ulterior motive in introducing a piece of legislation, that motive could not
render the passing of the law in mala fide.' This kind of "transferred malice,"
Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote, is unknown in the field of legislation.263
The Chief Justice reiterated his view in Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, in
which the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers
Ordinance, 1984 was under challenge. 65 Armed with an elaborate discussion
on the "legislative" nature of the power involved,2" the Chief Justice parroted
the obvious conclusion: "While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional
when it transgresses constitutional limits, they are precluded from inquiring
into the propriety of the exercise of the legislative power.""'6 It has to be
assumed that the legislative discretion is properly exercised, he wrote.26 True
to the first strategy, Chief justice Chandrachud worked out the possibility of
judicial review with an exclusive focus on the legislative nature of the power.
That it was prefaced by distinct conditionalities almost did not matter.269
For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that on a prior
occasion, the Supreme Court leaned the other way in the Nagaraj, Reddy, and
Wadhwa narrative. In Roy v. India,270 the constitutional validity of the National
Security Ordinance was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that presidential
satisfaction in Article 123, Section i was conditional and therefore justiciable. 7 ,
258 Nagaraj, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 551; see also Sugar Ltd. v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1533; Punjab
v. Dang, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 903.
25 Nagaraj, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 551, para. 31.
26 0 Id.
26 1 Id
262 Id. para. 36.
263Id.
264 Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724.
265 Id.
266 See, e.g., Garg v. India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 947, para. 6 (Bhagwati, J.).
267 Reddy, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724, para. 14.
268 Id.
z69 See also Wadhwa v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579, para. 6 (Bhagwati, C.J.).
270 Roy v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710.
27 Id.
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The Supreme Court avoided the argument. The ordinance had already been
enacted into an act, mooting the question of presidential satisfaction.2 72 And
Chief Justice Chandrachud had doubts about the proper rules of evidence
governing such matters: "We are not sure whether a question like the one
before us would be governed by the rule of burden of proof contained in
Section io6 of the Evidence Act."'" Roy did not formally resolve the question
of judicial review.
Nonetheless, some observations suggest that the Court was open to a
contrary narrative. First, unlike in Rajasthan v. India, 74 it hesitated in
halfheartedly weaving the "doctrine of political question" into Article 123.
Second, the potential significance of the deleted "finality clause" mentioned
earlier was not lost. "It is arguable that the 4 4 th Constitution Amendment Act
leaves no doubt that judicial review is not totally excluded.",,, 6 And then there
was the discussion of evidentiary burden. The burden of establishing the
existence of relevant circumstances, A.K. Roy argued, was on the Union of
India: "When any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the
burden of proving that fact is upon him."" Without rejecting the standard
outright, Chief Justice Chandrachud doubted the applicability of the Evidence
Act to the matter. "We are not sure whether a question like the one before us
would be governed by the rule of burden of proof contained in Section 1o6 of
the Evidence Act, though we are prepared to proceed on the basis," he said."a
The remarks held promise for those enthusiastic about the prospects of
judicial review. After all, a discussion on evidentiary burden is relevant only
after leaping the first hurdle of judicial review.
This blip notwithstanding, the first strategy in Nagaraj, Reddy, and
Wadhwa remains paradigmatic of the Supreme Court. In some ways, the doubts
in Roy stand overruled: Nagaraj, Reddy, and Wadhwa were decided later in time.
But Roy does show that the "legislative" nature of the satisfaction in Article
123, Section i does not necessarily exhaust the potential for judicial review.
In Singh v. Bihar,2 9 Justice Sujata Manohar mostly adopted the second
strategy in invalidating gubernatorial satisfaction under Article 213-the only
occasion when the Supreme Court has taken such a view. In December 1989,
the state of Bihar took over the management and control of non-governmental
schools through the Bihar Non-Government Sanskrit Schools (Taking Over
272 Id. para. 28.
27 Id. para. 29.
274 Rajasthan v. India, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1361.
275 Id. para. 26.
276 Id. para. 27.
2 Indian Evidence Act of 1872, Act i of 1872, § o6, available at http://chddistrictcourts
.gov.in/THE%2olNDIAN%2oEVIDENCE%2oACT.pdf.
278 Roy v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, para. 29.
279 Singh v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2288.
Management and Control) Ordinance, 1989. The Ordinance was re-
promulgated seven times with substantially the same terms.2" Finally, it
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lapsed on April 30, 1992, nearly forty months after its initial promulgation.
All ordinances, including the original and re-promulgated versions, Justice
Manohar wrote, were invalid.28 1 Executing the maneuvers in the second
strategy of ordinance analysis, she presented her analysis in three steps.
To begin with, Justice Manohar is careful in dissociating ordinances from
acts. While recognizing both as products of legislative power, she is quick to
insist on the conditionalities that make the former exceptional:
Article 213 . .. gives to the Governor who acts on the aid and advice of
the Executive, the legislative power to promulgate an Ordinance when
the Governor is satisfied that immediate action is required at a time
when both the Houses of the State Legislature . .. are not in session.2
Article 213, Section 2, she reminds us, has certain safeguards.
Ordinances promulgated this way must pass before both the Houses when
they reassemble. They are also of a limited duration, ceasing to have effect six
weeks after the reassembly of the legislature. With the exceptions firmly
outlined, Justice Manohar turned to the question of judicial review.
The manner in which a series of ordinances have been promulgated in
the present case by the state of Bihar also clearly shows misuse by the
Executive of Article 213. It is a fraud on the Constitution. The State of
Bihar had not even averred that any immediate action was required
when the st ordinance was promulgate[d]. It has not stated when the
Legislative assembly was convened after the first Ordinance or an[y]
of the subsequent Ordinances, how long it was in session, whether the
ordinance in force was placed before it or why for a period of two
years and four months proper legislation could not be passed.
She continued as follows:
The constitutional scheme does not permit this kind of Ordinance
Raj. In my view all the ordinances form a part of a chain of executive
280 Id.
28 Id. para. 15.
282 Id.
283 Id. para. 25.
284 Id. para. 20.
28 Id.
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8 Id. para. 25 (emphasis added).
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acts designed to nullify the scheme of Article 213 .... All are
unconstitutional and invalid particularly when there is no basis shown
for the exercise of power under Article 213. There is also no explanation
offered for promulgating one Ordinance after another. If the entire
exercise is a fraud on the power conferred by Article 213, with no
intention of placing any Ordinance before the legislature, it is difficult
to hold that first Ordinance is valid, even though all others may be
invalid78
In finding that the Governor's satisfaction was fraudulent, justice Manohar
seemed to rely on two observations. First, the state of Bihar did not justify the
need for immediate action-that is, for the need to invoke its legislative
powers under Article 213. And second, it acted "with no intention of placing
any Ordinance before the legislature."'8 Both those premises helped her to
the conclusion that the Governor's satisfaction was motivated by fraud.
This finding is remarkable. Never before had the Supreme Court
invalidated presidential satisfaction based on motive. Extending bases of
review ordinarily reserved for executive power to ordinances is decidedly
novel, and Justice Manohar was careful to circumscribe her principles to
circumstantially conditional legislative power under Article 123 only. She did
not suggest that she was willing to review the exercise of ordinarily conditional
legislative power under Article 245 on similar grounds, but she impliedly
assumed an intermediate legislative category described earlier, one that is
neither fully executive nor fully legislative. Nonetheless, this view did not
achieve finality. In his separate opinion in the same matter, justice Wadhwa
differed with his colleague on the reviewability of presidential satisfaction:
Such subjective satisfaction, he thought, was not reviewable. 290 With
intractable differences among the Justices, the matter went to a larger bench
for consideration. 9'
The third strategy has relatively few advocates, but it does have some. In
the United States, for example, Jeffrey Shaman has argued for doing away with
the principle that legislative acts cannot be reviewed for motive.292 In his
28 Id. para. 25 (emphasis added).
289 Id.
290 Id. para. 70.
291 Id. para. 75.
292 See JEFFREY SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 143-72
(2ooi). Since the 196os, legislative motive has been central to the analysis of
constitutionality of legislation in the United States. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motivation, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 132-33; Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); Clark, Legislative
Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953
(1978); Eisenburg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
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survey of legislative motive in United States constitutional law, Shaman
concluded that "although the Supreme Court has long professed that
legislative motive is irrelevant to determining a law's constitutionality, the
Court has honored that tenet more in its breach than its observance."29 3 And
given how frequently the Court does consider legislative motive, "it is more
accurate to say that in actual practice legislative motive is relevant to a law's
constitutionality and may be taken into account in reviewing a law."2 9 4 There
are no good reasons, Shaman concludes, why legislative motive should be
ignored in deciding the constitutionality of a law." Similar arguments are
easily adaptable to the Indian context. In line with the third strategy, the
argument for examining motive might just as easily proceed from acts to
ordinances as it might from ordinances to acts.
Having laid out the various approaches and their applications in judicial
decisions and scholarly literature, we return to the question with which we
began: is presidential satisfaction in Article 123, Section i subject to judicial
review? The answer to that question, as I have tried to suggest earlier, depends
on the interpretive strategy one adopts, since the text is unhelpful on this
point. The first strategy generates a negative answer, while the second and the
third have the potential for an affirmative response, though not without
unsettling accepted features of legislative review principles. It depends on
what one chooses to emphasize or deemphasize in the text. But that is
guidance a passive piece of text cannot provide. The choice must be that of the
reader.
This raises a key question: are all three strategies equally valid? Two
factors push me toward an affirmative response. First, the reference to
"validity" assumes that there is some higher principle that can help arbitrate
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Simon, Racially Prejudiced
Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial
Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and
Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1376 (1979);
Note, Using Constitutional Zoning to Neutralize Adult Entertainment--Detroit to New
York, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 455 (1977); Challenging Exclusionary Zoning Practices, io U.
RICH. L. REV. 646 (1976); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured
Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 1 (1983); Note, Making the Violation Fit the
Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982); Leonard
H. Glantz, Abortion and the Supreme Court: Why Legislative Motive Matters, 76
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1452 (1986); Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative
Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1988); David
L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 41, 90-91 (2oo6). The use or otherwise of legislative motive in invalidating statutes
has a long, convoluted history in U.S. constitutional law. For an attempt to explain the
various phases of the doctrine, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2oo8).
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between these competing strategies. I am skeptical that this is true. Second,
internally, the strategies engage in a form that is easily recognizable as "legal
argument." They have a structure and arrangement that contain conventional
features of "arguments." It is unclear if there is some other meta-anvil on
which these arguments might be tested.296
Be that as it may, any affirmative answer to the substantive question of the
availability of judicial review is not the end of the matter. On the contrary, it
raises a host of other challenging questions. On what grounds, other than
motive, is the President's satisfaction reviewable? And who has the burden to
establish motive? Does it lie on the challenger to prove that the President's
satisfaction was vitiated by improper motive, or does it lie on the Union of
India to establish that the President's motive was proper? A fuller account of
judicial review in Article 123, Section i, subject to an affirmative conclusion,
would require analysis of these questions as well.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS: IS THERE ANY SUCH THING AS A "ROGUE" ORDINANCE?
A. The "Substantive" Question: Ordinances and Subject Matter Limitations
Finally, in relation to the text of Article 123, there is the question of
substance. Do ordinances have substantive limits? Or, to put it differently, are
some areas of subject matter excluded from the scope of ordinances? An
ordinance, originating as it does from the exercise of executive power, cannot
be classified as "law."29" That, we have already seen, was the argument in Roy v.
India.2' 8 Denying an ordinance the status of law, it was further argued, had
important implications for its content. Specific actions under the Constitution,
such as restricting the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III, require the
sanction of law. To the extent that ordinances are not law, using them to limit
fundamental rights is unconstitutional. Conversely, rights in the Constitution
would be reduced to a dead letter if the powers of the executive were read in a
manner validating the restriction on fundamental rights without formal
legislative support. 99 Either way, the upshot of this minority argument in Roy
was that certain subject matter, such as that relating to fundamental rights,
could not be governed through ordinances. This argument was weak, and the
majority in Roy rightly rejected them.
For one, there is a fallacy that gnaws at the entire argument. The fear of
executive intrusion into fundamental rights is unfounded to the extent that
ordinances are subject to the same substantive and jurisdictional limits as acts
296 For an introduction to the concept of "argument-bytes" in legal reasoning, see
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 87-152 (2008).




Columbia journal ofAsian Law, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2oo)
of Parliament. When an ordinance that unreasonably infringes upon
fundamental rights or regulates subject matter outside Parliament's legislative
competence is challenged, courts are well within their authority to strike it
down as unconstitutional, just as they could with an act. An ordinance cannot
do or achieve anything that an act of Parliament cannot do: "If and so far as an
Ordinance ... makes any provision which Parliament would not under this
Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void."3 oo
In addition, the text itself disarms the argument.3 o" Article 13, Section 2
provides that the State shall make no law abridging the fundamental rights
that Part III guarantees and that any law made in contravention of this
provision shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Article 13, Section 3
clarifies that "law" includes ordinances unless context otherwise requires. 30 2
Article 367, the "interpretation" clause of the Constitution, affirms this
reading.
Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of, or made by,
Parliament, or to Acts or laws of, or made by, the Legislature of a
State, shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance
made by the President or, to an Ordinance made by a Governor, as the
case may be.30 3
Taken together, both Article 13, Section 2 and Article 367, Section 2
establish a high textual barrier that must be overcome for anyone suggesting
that the Constitution substantively limits the scope of ordinances.
Justice Gupta made one such effort. In his partial dissent in Roy, he turned
to the description of ordinances in Article 123: "An Ordinance promulgated
under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of
Parliament."30 4 For him, it was obvious "that when something is said to have
the force and effect of an Act of Parliament, that is because it is not really an
Act of Parliament."3o' To explain the significance of the distinction as he saw it,
Justice Gupta turned to Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution. Article 356,
Section 1 provides as follows:
If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or
otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation (a)
3" INDIA CONST. art. 123, § 3.
30 Roy v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, para. 13-14.
302 Id. para. 13.
303 INDIA CONST. art. 367, § 2.
304 Id. art. 123, § 2.
305 Roy v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, para. 120 (emphasis added).
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assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the
State ... other than the Legislature of the State.',3o
6
When a Proclamation is in operation, under Article 357, Section i grants
Parliament authority "to confer on the President the power of the Legislature
of the State to make laws."30 Such laws, whether made by Parliament or the
President, continue to remain in force even after the Proclamation has ceased
to exist until altered, repealed, or amended by a competent legislature or other
authority.308 Justice Gupta's reading of the differences in the nature of laws the
President is authorized to make under Articles 123 and 357 led him to the
conclusion that ordinances have subject matter limitations:
It will appear that whereas an ordinance issued under article 123 has
the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, under article 357(1)
(a) Parliament can confer on the President the power of the legislature
of the State to make laws. Thus, where the President is required to
make laws, the Constitution has provided for it. The difference in the
nature of the power exercised by the President under article 123. and
under article 357 is clear and cannot be ignored.3 o"
Justice Gupta continued as follows:
Under Article 21 no person can be deprived of life and liberty except
according to procedure established by law .... An ordinance which
has to be laid before both Houses of Parliament and ceases to operate
at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, . . .
can hardly be said to have that "firmness" and "permanence" that the
word "established" implies. It is not the temporary duration of an
ordinance that is relevant in the present context, an Act of Parliament
may also be temporary; what is relevant is its provisional and tentative
character which is apparent from Article 123 § 2(a).3
Justice Gupta's attempt to find subject matter limitations in Article 123
fails for at least two reasons. First, the starting point itself is problematic.
Ordinances are not acts of Parliament; no one argues they are. It is precisely
because they are not acts that the Constitution introduces the fiction of "same
force and effect." The argument gains no ground by creating a distinction the
Constitution itself already created. Second, direct comparisons between the
nature and scope of presidential legislative powers in Article 123 and Article
3 INDIA CONST. art. 356, § 1.
" Id. art. 357.
3 Id. art. 357, § 2.
Roy v. India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, para. 120.
310 Id.
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357, Section i are untenable. Article 123 deals with cases of legislative
emergency in non-emergency times. When used in good faith, it is intended to
remedy situations where a sudden need for particular legislation arises and
Parliament is not in session. In contrast, Article 357, Section i deals with cases
of broad constitutional breakdown. When used in good faith, it refers to
situations where the President is satisfied that a state cannot govern in
accordance with the Constitution, requiring the Union Cabinet to take the
reins of control. Also, Article 123 provides original power to legislate. The
Constitution itself gives the President authority to promulgate ordinances. The
power to legislate under Article 357, Section i, however, is a delegated power
that the President may utilize if and only if Parliament authorizes him to do
so. Therefore, arguments based on a comparative reading of the two provisions
are misleading. The two provisions deal with different circumstances, are
based on different sources of power, and have different goals. To say that
Article 123 is different from Article 357 gets us nowhere. They are different.
Nonetheless, limitations on the substantive scope of ordinances do have
great potential value. What does one need to make out a reasonably tenable
case that the Constitution imposes subject matter constraints on ordinances?
Three conditions must be satisfied. First, the limitation must originate in the
"scheme" or "fabric" of the Constitution. Second, the limitation must be in
agreement with original intent. We saw earlier that the Constituent Assembly
categorically rejected an effort to draft a "rights limitation" into Article 123.
Third, the argument must account for the clear act-ordinance equivalence in
at least three provisions of the Constitution. I am skeptical that there could be
a coherent argument that satisfies all three conditions.
B. The Tax Ordinance and a Subject Matter Challenge in Pakistan
The Supreme Court of Pakistan recently attempted to read a subject
matter limitation into the Pakistan Constitution. In June 2009, Pakistan's
National Parliament approved a budget proposal imposing a "carbon
surcharge" on crude oil, raising oil prices by 1o.5 percent."31 Intended to raise
revenues to the tune of $1.5 billion, the proposal stemmed from a supposed
need to avoid a balance-of-payment crisis under the IMF's loan program.312 In
July 2009, the Supreme Court invalidated the price hike. Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry, in a temporary order, doubted the need for and effectiveness of the
hike.
3" Pakistani Court Suspends Carbon Surcharge on Petrol, .REUTERS (July 7, 2009),
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idlNIndia-4o8 7222009o7o 7 ; see also
Khalid Qayum, Pakistan Imposes New Fuel Levy After Court Suspends Carbon Tax,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2o6oo9i&sid=
a9 SQkKQk.N8Q; Nasir Iqbal, Supreme Court Puts Carbon Tax on Hold, DAWN (July 8,
2009), http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/
business/u-supreme-court-suspends-carbon-tax--il--oi.
2 Pakistani Court Suspends Carbon Surcharge on Petrol, REUTERS (July 7, 2009),
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idlNIndia-4o872220090707.
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Having gone through the amendment in the Petroleum Products
(Petroleum Development Levy) Ordinance, 1961 as introduced by the
Finance Act, 2009, prima facie, we are of the view that there was no
justification for imposition of carbon surcharge in place of PDL
because such a tax could be imposed subject to certain conditions,
such as provision of petroleum products free of lead or carbon dioxide
and consequential pollution free atmosphere to all citizens?
The next day, President Zardari responded by promulgating the Petroleum
Development Levy (Amendment) Ordinance. 3 1 It imposed a petrol tax,
effectively nullifying the Supreme Court order. " Not surprisingly, the
Ordinance was promptly challenged. Advocate Shoaib Shahid argued that the
Ordinance violated numerous provisions of the Pakistan Constitution
including Articles 2A (Objectives Resolution to Form Part of Substantive
Provisions), 4 (Rights of Individual to be Dealt With in Accordance with the
Law), 5 (Loyalty to State and Obedience to Constitution), 8 (Laws Inconsistent
with Fundamental Rights to be Void), 9 (Security of Person), 25 (Equality of
Citizens), 37 (Promotion of Social Justice and Eradication of Social Evils), 38
(Promotion of Social and Economic Well-Being of the People), 77 (Tax to be
Levied by Law Only), and 89 (Powers of President to Promulgate
Ordinance).36
At its core, Shahid's argument was simple: ordinances cannot be used for
certain purposes, and imposing new taxes is one such prohibited purpose.' 7 To
put it differently, while acts and ordinances are generally parallel, there is an
implicit hierarchy that restricts the substantive scope of ordinances318 Similar
to Cooper, the Supreme Court of Pakistan refused to be drawn into the matter
immediately.319 The petitioner lacked locus standi, and the High Court, not the
3 Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 2080 of 2009 and Constitution Petitions No. 33
& 34 of 2005, para. 7, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user-files/File/CONST.P
.33-34-200 5 .pdf
314 Pakistan Petrol Tax Row Continues, BBC NEWS (July 1o, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south asia/8143692.stm.




3 Pakistan Petrol Tax Row Continues, BBC NEWS (July 1o, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south asia/8143692.stm.
318 Masood Rehman, PDL Ordinance Challenged in Supreme Court, DAILY TIMES (July 11,
2009), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=20o9\o 7 \li\story-u-7-2oo9-pg1-4.
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Supreme Court, was the proper forum to argue it.320 It remains to be seen if
this argument will succeed when the case is eventually heard. Interestingly,
President Zardari reissued the Ordinance in November 2009, now titled
"Petroleum Products (Petroleum Development Levy) (Amendment) Ordinance,
2009." This occurred barely a week before it was scheduled to lapse in
accordance with the provisions of Article 89.' This re-promulgation takes us
back to our earlier discussion in Wadhwa32 and its Pakistani counterpart,
Collector of Customs.?3 It is unlikely that the November 2oo9 re-promulgation
satisfies the high bar of "adequate reasons" suggested in both decisions.
CONCLUSION
Where does all this leave us? This article began from the premise that
ordinances are an aberration in a parliamentary democracy and set out
reasons to restrict their constitutional scope. Ordinances are common in both
India and Pakistan. When the executive resorts to governance-by-ordinance
without sufficient cause, it undermines the democratic mechanisms of a
parliamentary system. The use of ordinances is particularly egregious when
purposefully designed to avoid ordinary legislative scrutiny. While the
Supreme Courts of both India and Pakistan have an acceptable record in some
aspects of interpretation (for example, developing limits on re-promulgation),
they have performed less admirably in other areas. The Supreme Court of
India in particular has failed to critically evaluate the rules on whether lapsed
ordinances have continuing legal effect and on the reviewability of presidential
satisfaction prior to promulgation. In contrast, Pakistan's challenges may lie
more with the constitutional text than with the judicial exegesis that has
grown around it. For that reason, it is difficult to assess the utility of textual
arguments in general terms. The textual language is unhelpful in assessing
limits on re-promulgation and judicial review of presidential satisfaction,
though it clearly resolves some issues concerning temporal and substantive
limits on ordinances.
This discussion concludes my analysis of "substitutive" executive control,
but two areas remain untouched. In a follow-up article, I propose to explore
presidential and gubernatorial influence on primary legislation and control
over state legislation by the Union Council of Ministers. The introduction to
this article discusses the latter sort of "influence." Even when presidents and
governors do not enact ordinances, they enjoy considerable influence over
primary legislation, especially when they are not in cahoots with the Council
3o Id. See also SC Returns Petition Against PDL Ordinance, DAILY TIMES (July 16, 2009),
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2oo9\o7\i6\story_16-7-2oo9pg7-5.
' President Extends Petroleum Levy Ordinance 2009, GEo TELEVISION NETWoRK (Nov. i,
2009), http://www.geo.tv/n-1-2009/52154.htm.
32Wadhwa v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579.
Collector of Customs, Karachi v. New Electronics Ltd., P.L.D. 1994 S.C. 363.
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of Ministers. Presidents and governors, on such occasions, are required to act
independently, applying their minds to specific circumstances. These
peripheral powers of influence can delay or even determine the legislation
signed into law.
